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Abstract
We show that the Folk Theorem holds for n-player discounted repeated game with
bounded-memory pure strategies. Our result requires each player’s payoff to be strictly
above the pure minmax payoff but requires neither time-dependent strategies, nor pub-
lic randomization, nor communication. The type of strategies we employ to establish
our result turn out to have new features that may be important in understanding
repeated interactions.
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1 Introduction
The extensive multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) payoffs in repeated games,
described by Folk Theorems of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), is due to players’ ability to
condition their behavior arbitrarily on the past. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect, as
suggested by Aumann (1981), that this multiplicity may be reduced by restricting players
to use limited memory strategies.
In Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2009) we show that this intuition, however, does not
hold when the set of actions in the stage game of the repeated game is sufficiently “large”
so that each payoff profile is not isolated. In such games we prove that the Folk Theorem
with SPE as the solution concept (henceforth, we shall refer to such Folk Theorems by FT)
continues to hold with one period memory strategies where at each date players’ behavior
depend only on the outcome of the game in the previous period. The large action space
assumption is critical in establishing this results because it allows players to encode the
entire history of the past into the previous period’s actions.1
In the same study we show that when the action spaces are not “large”, it is possible
that no efficient payoff vector can be supported by a one period memory SPE strategy
profile even if the discount factor is near one, validating the argument of Aumann (1981)
with one period memory strategies and finite actions. Thence, the question is whether or not
the multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs prevails with finite actions and limited memory (not
necessarily restricted to be one period). More specifically, does the FT depend critically on
being able to recall the history of play all the way back to the beginning?
In the current paper, we prove that the FT for discounted repeated game continues to hold
with time-independent bounded memory pure strategies, even when the action sets are finite.
Specifically we show that, when players are sufficiently patient, any strictly individually
rational payoff vector can be approximately sustained by a pure subgame perfect equilibrium
1 More formally, with rich action sets any equilibrium strategy vector in which each player strictly prefers
not to deviate at every history, can be perturbed so that each player chooses different actions at different
histories. With such distinct plays of the game, at each date the players can use the outcome of the previous
period to coordinate their actions appropriately. Thus, the original equilibrium can be approximated by
another that has one period recall.
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strategy profile that at each stage recalls the outcomes of finite number of previous periods.2
Moreover, we show that the bound on the number of periods that the player need to recall
to establish the result is uniform in terms of the set of individually rational payoffs, and
depends only on the desired degree of payoff approximation.
One issue in repeated game literature concerns the multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs.
Another is about understanding the precise behavior that satisfy intertemporal incentives
in repeated contexts. Our result is important not only because it shows that the FT does
not depend on being able to recall the history of play all the way back to the beginning,
but also because the kind of strategies/behaviour needed to ensure intertemporal incentives
with limited memory turn out to have new features that may be significant in understanding
repeated interactions.
There are many reasons why one might be interested in results with limited memory.
First, there is the bounded rationality aspect in which players can only recall a finite amount
of public information concerning the past. The results from psychological literature also in-
dicate that people do not act on the entire history they observe and pay special attention to
recent history. Second, in many institutional set-ups it is the convention to remove all the
records after a certain number of years. Third, information that is not formally recorded is
often conveyed by word of mouth or by short-lived players representing overlapping gener-
ations. Fourth, having access to past information can be costly and in equilibrium players
may choose to recall a finite past. Finally, memory size may have implications for robust-
ness of equilibria. For example, Mailath and Morris (2002) and Mailath and Morris (2006)
show that private monitoring perturbations of public monitoring equilibria are robust if the
equilibria have bounded recall.
To appreciate the difficulties and the novel behavioral features needed in establishing a FT
with bounded memory, consider a typical “simple” strategy SPE profile used in proving the
standard FT in n-player repeated game. Such a strategy profile is described by n+1 infinite
paths pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n) consisting of the equilibrium path of play pi(0) and a punishment path
pi(i) for each player i. The strategies are such that game begins with pi(0) until some player
2We obtain the result without introducing any randomization or any external communication device that
allows the players to communicate.
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deviates singly from pi(0). At any stage, a single deviation by a player from any ongoing path
triggers the punishment path for that player; otherwise the game continues with the ongoing
path.
In the first instance, it may seem that the problem of implementing such a simple profile
with bounded memory is trivial if the memory size M is sufficiently large. In particular, if
each of the n + 1 paths has a finite cycle then each can be distinguished and implemented
as long as M is sufficiently large. Even when the paths are not finite one can approximate
the payoff corresponding to each path by a cyclical path. Therefore finite memory should
be sufficient to implement the paths approximately. But this is not enough. Strategies
must also be such that after observing the outcomes of the previous M periods the following
two critical properties hold: First, single player deviations can be detected and second, the
identity of the deviator is revealed. If either of the above two properties were not to hold,
there may be incentives for some player to deviate and manipulate the path of future play.3
With 1-period memory it is easy to see how such simple strategies may violate the above
properties. For example consider any two action profiles a and b respectively belonging to
two paths pi(i) and pi(j), for some i and j. Then the first property is violated if for some
player k, ak 6= bk and a−k = b−k. This is because when (bk, a−k) = b is observed it is not
clear if k has just deviated from pi(i) and the punishment for k needs to be triggered or if the
path pi(j) is being followed and no deviation has occurred. Similarly, the second property is
violated if, for a pair of players k and l, al 6= bl, ak 6= bk and a−l,k = b−l,k. This is because
in this case when (bk, al, a−k,l) = (bk, al, b−k,l) is observed, it is not clear which of the two
players k or l has deviated.
Does increasing the memory size help with ensuring that the above two properties hold?
The next two examples show that these difficulties cannot be solved so easily even with large,
but finite, memory.
Example 1: Consider a repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma in which at every date each player
can either cooperate C or defect D. Suppose that the players are sufficiently patient and
we want to implement a cycle path pi(0) = {pit}∞t=1 consisting of playing ((C,D), (D,C))
3In Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2009) we refer to simple strategies that satisfy the above two
properties as “confusion-proof”.
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repeatedly. Assume that such a path yields for each player an average payoff strictly higher
than the minmax payoff generated from playing (D,D).4 The simple strategy that plays
pi(0) on the equilibrium path and plays (D,D) forever for any history inconsistent with the
equilibrium path, is subgame perfect with unbounded memory. However, this strategy is
not subgame perfect if players can remember at most an arbitrary but finite number M of
past periods. To see this, consider any history with its last M entries (henceforth called
the M -tail) equal to (a1, pi2, . . . , piM), for any a1 6= pi1. Then the simple strategy prescribes
playing D for both players forever in the continuation game. But if piM = (D,C) then player
1 has the incentive to deviate. This is because if player 1 plays C instead of D at this
history, the play returns to the equilibrium path in the next period, as (pi2, . . . , piM , piM+1)
would be recalled. In the case when piM = (C,D), by an analogous reasoning, player 2 has
an incentive to deviate.
One way to overcome this difficulty may be to allow the play to continue along the equilib-
rium path even at some histories that are inconsistent with the equilibrium path. However,
this alone is not sufficient. For example, consider a strategy profile that is otherwise identical
to the above simple strategy profile except that it plays piM+1 at any history whose M -tail
equals (a1, pi2, . . . , piM) for any a1. In this case, if piM = (D,C) then player 2 will find it prof-
itable to deviate from D to C at any history with its M -tail equal to (a2, a1, pi2, . . . , piM−1),
for any a1 6= pi1 and any a2. By doing so, he produces a history with its M -tail equal to
(a1, pi2, . . . , piM) and brings the play back to the equilibrium path.
5 Thus, if we continue to
change the strategy by allowing the play to return to the equilibrium path at these prob-
lematic histories, an inductive argument would imply that the play must be the equilibrium
path after any possible history, a requirement clearly incompatible with subgame perfection.
The above example shows that increasing the memory size by itself does not guarantee
that the players can identify if there has been a deviation. The next example shows that the
problem of detecting the identify of the deviator can also not be easily resolved by having
large but finite memory.
4Barlo and Carmona (2007), a predecessor to the current paper, consider the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
with bounded memory. Example 1 is from this paper, which in turn attributes it to an anonymous referee.
5If piM = (C,D), player 1 has an incentive to deviate when (a2, a1, pi2, . . . , piM−1) is recalled.
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Example 2: In this example there are three players, each player i = 1, 2, 3 has three
actions αi, βi and γi in the stage game and the players discount the future by an arbitrarily
small amount. Let α = (α1, α2, α3) and suppose that the stage payoff ui for each i is such that
the action profile that minmaxes i is mi = (βi, α−i). Also, suppose that, for each i = 1, 2, 3,
mi is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game and ui(m
i) < ui(m
j) for all j = 0, . . . , 3, j 6= i,
wherem0 = (γ1, γ2, γ3).
6 Then with no memory restriction the simple strategy profile defined
by an equilibrium path pi(0) = {m0,m0, . . .} and a punishment path pi(i) = {mi,mi, . . .} for
each i = 1, 2, 3, implements m0 as a SPE.
Such simple strategy profile has the two features that when a deviator is identified the
punishment path for that player is implemented and that after any history the continuation
path corresponds to one of the four paths pi(0), . . . , pi(3). With finite memory, irrespective
of how large the memory is, implementing m0 as a SPE with strategies that have these
two features is no longer feasible. To see this fix the memory to be M and any strategy
profile f with these features. By the second feature, at any history with its M -tail equal to
(α, α, . . . α) the continuation strategy prescribes playing a path pi(j), for some j = 0, . . . , 3.
Consider any player i 6= j. Since f must play m0 initially, by the first feature, if i deviates
at date 1 by playing ai 6= m0i then f induces mi at date 2. Also, if player i deviates again
from mi at date 2 by playing αi instead of m
i
i = βi, α will be observed and f would prescribe
playing mi again. Further such deviations by i induces α again and thus, by induction, f
also specifies playing mi after a history consisting of (ai,m
0
−i) followed by α played (M − 1)
times. But then at such a history player i can profitably deviate by playing αi and inducing
a history consisting of M consecutive α’s. This is because his average continuation payoff
from the deviation would be almost ui(m
j), whereas by not deviating he obtains ui(m
i).
The problem in the above example is that α could be the result of single deviation by 1
from m1, 2 from m2 or 3 from m3. Therefore, the history consisting of α played M times
can be induced by any player through a sequence of deviations and cannot be attributed to
deviations by any particular player. Hence, given that ui(m
i) < ui(m
j) for all j = 0, . . . , 3,
j 6= i, there must be some profitable opportunities for some player.
6It is easy to construct an example with payoffs satisfying these properties.
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The problems of detecting the latest deviation and the identity of the deviator clearly do
not arise with unbounded memory because, for any history, one can use induction starting
from the first period of the history to find the latest deviation. With bounded memory, such
inductive reasoning, by definition, is not feasible. Therefore, to deal with these problems
with limited memory one needs to ensure that each of the paths that the candidate strategy
profile prescribes at each history are sufficiently distinct. This can be done if each action
profile in each path is distinct from those in other paths by at least three components (e.g.
Sabourian (1998)).7 In fact, the richness assumption in Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian
(2009) allows one to prove a Folk Theorem with bounded memory precisely because with
rich action spaces, one can construct such paths at the cost of perturbing all the payoffs by a
small amount. With finite action spaces, such an approach to making each path sufficiently
distinct is clearly not possible.
Nevertheless, in this paper we show that the objective of making each paths sufficiently
distinct, so that deviations and identity of deviators can be detected, can be achieved by
ensuring that each path contains specific sequences of actions, henceforth referred to as signal
sequences. Each of these signal sequences is carefully designed and appears infinitely often
along its respective path so that once any of them is observed the paths or deviations are
identified and the players know how to play the continuation game without the need to know
the entire past history. Effectively, signal sequences can be thought of as a set of rituals that
have to be played every so often so that the players can coordinate their future play in an
appropriate way to preserve the incentives (punishment or reward).
Introduction of such signal sequences, however, generates a new problem: we need to
ensure that it is in the interest of the players to play these sequences, i.e. the strategies with
such signals must still constitute a SPE. This makes the construction of signal sequences
and punishment paths needed to induce them rather intricate and complicated (particularly
for games with more than 2 players). Nevertheless, we show that this is a feasible task and,
thereby, demonstrate that the FT remains valid with bounded memory.
Independently and at the same time Mailath and Olszewski (2009) have considered the
7 Assuming such distinctness, Sabourian (1998) provides a characterization for the set of SPE outcomes
of repeated games for the case of no discounting and finite number of pure actions.
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problem of establishing the FT with bounded memory. Their result is however a special case
of ours. Specifically, they show that the FT holds with time-dependent bounded memory in
games with more than two players. Our result is more general than theirs because we do
not require players to condition their strategies on calendar time and because our FT also
holds for two player.8 The former is important because calendar time is unbounded and one
of the reasons for limiting the analysis to bounded memory is to bound the set of objects on
which the players can condition their behavior.
The main motivation of Mailath and Olszewski (2009) is however different from us as
they are primary interested in demonstrating that the perfect monitoring FT is behaviorally
robust to almost-perfect almost-public private monitoring. As shown by Mailath and Morris
(2002) and Mailath and Morris (2006), time-dependent bounded memory, however, is all that
is required for this. Therefore, their result is sufficient to establish that the above robustness
exercise is valid for games with more than two players.
We are on the other hand interested to the robustness of the FT to bounds on the
set of objects on which the players can condition their behavior (a bounded rationality
exercise). With this in mind, we did not want take the time-dependence route as it allows
for conditioning on an object that is unbounded (infinite “complexity”).
In contrast to our results, in some related literature bounds on the memory do result
in significant reduction in the set of equilibria in repeated set-ups. However, these results
require additional assumption(s) beyond bounded memory. For example, Liu and Skrzy-
pacz (2010) show that in a dynamic model with one long-lived player facing a sequence of
short-lived players and complete information, bounds on the memory can have a dramatical
impact on the equilibrium set (only Nash equilibria of the stage game are consistent with
limited memory).9 Their results, however, is critically dependent on the players being able
to condition their behavior only on past actions of the other players (strategies are reactive).
Cole and Kocherlakota (2005) consider the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with imperfect
8The proof of the FT with two players in our first version of the paper were rather cumbersome. We have
simplified the proof as a result of conversations with George Mailath and Wojciech Olszwski. We would like
to thank them for these very useful conversations.
9They also show that, with bounded memory, equilibria in games with complete and incomplete infor-
mation are strikingly different.
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public monitoring and finite memory. They show that for some set of parameters defection
every period is the only strongly symmetric public perfect equilibrium with bounded mem-
ory (regardless of the discount factor), whereas the set strongly symmetric public perfect
strategies with unbounded recall is strictly larger. The example considered by Cole and
Kocherlakota (2005) does not satisfy the identifiability condition used in Fudenberg, Levine,
and Maskin (1994) to establish their Folk Theorems for repeated games with imperfect
monitoring. By strengthening those identifiability conditions and by allowing asymmetric
strategies, Ho¨rner and Olszewski (2009) obtain a perfect Folk Theorem with bounded mem-
ory strategies for games with (public or private but almost public) imperfect monitoring and
finite action and outcome spaces. Their result, however, requires a rich set of public signals
and displays a trade-off between the discount factor and the length of the memory.10
2 Notation and Definitions
The stage game: A normal form game G is defined by G =
(
N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N
)
, where
N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players, Ai is the set of player i’s actions and ui :
∏
i∈N Ai →
R is player i’s payoff function. We assume that Ai is finite and |Ai| ≥ 2 for all i ∈ N .
Let A =
∏
i∈N Ai and A−i =
∏
j 6=iAi. We enumerate the set of action profiles by
A = {a1, . . . , ar} with r = |A|.
For any i ∈ N denote respectively the minmax payoff and a minmax profile for player
i by vi = mina−i∈A−i maxai∈Ai ui(ai, a−i) and m
i ∈ argmina−i∈A−i maxai∈Ai ui(ai, a−i). If G
is a 2-player game, a mutual minmax profile is m¯ = (m21,m
1
2) ∈ A. We shall denote the
maximum payoff in absolute value some player can obtain by B = maxi∈N maxa∈A |ui(a)|.
Let U = {u ∈ co (u(A)) : ui ≥ vi for all i ∈ N} denote the set of individually rational
payoffs and U0 = {u ∈ co(u(A) : ui > vi for all i ∈ N} denote the set of strictly individually
rational payoffs. The game G is full-dimensional if the interior of U in Rn is nonempty.
The repeated game: The infinitely repeated game consists of an infinite sequence of
repetitions of G. We denote the action of any player i in the repeated game at any date
10Other works on repeated games with bounded (recall) memory include Kalai and Stanford (1988), Lehrer
(1988), Aumann and Sorin (1989), Lehrer (1994), Neyman and Okada (1999), Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo
(2002), and Dutta and Siconolfi (2010).
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t = 1, 2, 3, . . . by ati ∈ Ai. Also, let at = (at1, . . . , atn) be the profile of choices at t.
For t ≥ 1, a t-stage history is a sequence h = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ At (the t-fold Cartesian
product of A). The set of all t-stage histories is denoted by Ht = A
t. We represent the
initial (empty) history by H0. The set of all histories is defined by H =
⋃
t∈N0 Ht.
11 We also
denote the length of any history h ∈ H by `(h).
Let Π = A× A× · · · = A∞ be the set of (infinite) outcome paths in the repeated game.
For any a ∈ A and k ∈ N, we denote a finite path consisting of a being played k times
consecutively by (a; k). Also, for two positive length histories h = (a1, . . . , a`(h)) and h¯ =
(a¯1, . . . , a¯`(h¯)) inH we define the concatenation of h and h¯ by h·h¯ = (a1, . . . , a`(h), a¯1, . . . , a¯`(h¯)).
For any non-empty history h = (a1, . . . , a`(h)) ∈ H and any integer 0 < m ≤ `(h), define
the m-tail of h by Tm(h) = (a`(h)−m+1, . . . , a`(h)). We also adopt the convention that T 0(h) is
the empty history. For all h ∈ H and all k′ ∈ N with k′ ≤ `(h), let Bk′(h) = (a1, . . . , a`(h)−k′)
denote the history obtained from h by removing the last k′ actions.
For all i ∈ N , a strategy for player i is a function fi : H → Ai mapping histories into
actions. The set of player i’s strategies is denoted by Fi, and F =
∏
i∈N Fi with a typical
element f = (f1, . . . , fn). Given a strategy fi ∈ Fi and a history h ∈ H we denote the
strategy induced by fi at h by fi|h. Thus, (fi|h)(h¯) = fi(h · h¯) for every h¯ ∈ H. We will use
(f |h) to denote (f1|h, . . . , fn|h) for every f = (f1, . . . , fn) ∈ F and h ∈ H.
Any strategy profile f ∈ F induces an outcome path pi(f) = {pi1(f), pi2(f), . . .} ∈ Π
where pi1(f) = f(H0) and pi
t(f) = f(pi1(f), . . . , pit−1(f)) for any t > 1.
We assume that all players discount the future returns by a common discount factor δ ∈
(0, 1). Thus, the payoff in the repeated game is given by Ui(f, δ) = (1−δ)
∑∞
t=1 δ
t−1ui(pit(f)).
For any pi ∈ Π, t ∈ N, and i ∈ N , let V ti (pi, δ) = (1− δ)
∑∞
r=t δ
r−tui(pir) be the continuation
payoff of player i at date t if the outcome path pi is played. For simplicity, we write Vi(pi, δ)
instead of V 1i (pi, δ). Also, when the meaning is clear we shall not explicitly mention δ and
refer to Ui(f, δ), V
t
i (pi, δ) and Vi(pi, δ) by Ui(f), V
t
i (pi) and Vi(pi) respectively.
We denote the repeated game described above for discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) by G∞(δ).
A strategy vector f ∈ F is a Nash equilibrium of G∞(δ) if Ui(f) ≥ Ui(fˆi, f−i) for all i ∈ N
and fˆi ∈ Fi. Also, f ∈ F is a SPE of G∞(δ) if f |h is a Nash equilibrium for all h ∈ H.
11We use N0 and N to denote, respectively, the set of non-negative and positive integers.
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For all M ∈ N, we say that f ∈ F is a M-memory strategy if f(h) = f(h¯) for all h, h¯ ∈ H
such that TM(h) = TM(h¯). A strategy profile f is a M-memory SPE if f is a M -memory
strategy and a SPE.
3 The bounded memory Folk Theorem
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 1 Let G be a n-player game and suppose that either G is full-dimensional or
n = 2 and U0 6= ∅. Then, for all ε > 0, there exists M ∈ N and δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all
u ∈ U and δ ≥ δ∗, there exists a M-memory SPE f of G∞(δ) such that ‖U(f, δ)− u‖ < ε.
Restricting strategies to have bounded memory immediately implies that, after every
history, the path induced by any bounded memory strategy must eventually enter a cycle.
Thus, with bounded memory the set of individually rational payoffs can at best be imple-
mented approximately. As a result, in the above FT the size of the memory M needed
depends on the degree of approximation ε. However, note that M is independent of the
individual rational payoff u that is being implemented and the discount factor δ.
We next provide an intuition for the proof of Theorem 1. The proof itself can be found
in the Appendix.
3.1 Intuition for the 2-player case
In 2-player games, the standard FT construction for sustaining an individually rational payoff
vector u as a SPE is a simple strategy profile that has the following structure: (i) it has
an equilibrium path pi that induces u and (ii) a common punishment path that starts with
a punishment phase consisting of playing the mutual minmax m¯ for some finite number of
time T and then plays the equilibrium path pi.
Our FT construction with bounded memory involves modifying the above standard con-
struction to deal with the issues that bounded memory raises. First, as explained above,
with bounded memory the set of individually rational payoffs can at best be implemented
approximately.
Second, as illustrated by the examples in the Introduction, the identification of the on-
going path and whether or not there has been a single player deviation can be difficult with
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bounded memory. This implies that the equilibrium path and the punishment path need to
be chosen carefully so that the above problems can be overcome when players observe only
a fixed window of past outcomes. This issue will be dealt with by designing the equilibrium
cycle appropriately. The key idea is to insert a signalling sequence of actions regularly in
the equilibrium path. The purpose of this signalling sequence is that, once players have
observed it, they can infer that the play is in the equilibrium path and can, therefore, ignore
the part of the history that has occurred before. For such identification to be both possible
and immune to single player deviations, the following must hold: the signalling sequence of
actions must appear infinitely often on the equilibrium path, it should not appear anywhere
else and no single player deviation, either from the equilibrium path or from the punishment
path, should be able to escape the punishment phase.
Specifically, our construction of the bounded memory equilibrium strategy is as follows.
Since the discount factor is close to 1, for any path changing the order by which actions are
played has an insignificant impact on the payoffs the players receive. Therefore, to approx-
imately implement the desired payoff profile u, all that matters is that each action profile
is played a fraction of times sufficiently close to its coefficient in the convex combination of
stage game payoffs yielding u. This irrelevance of the order allows us to define the equilib-
rium path pi = {pi1, pi2, . . .} as the repetition of the cycle ((a1; p1), . . . , (ar; pr)),12 where, (i)
a1 is chosen to be such that it differs from the mutual minmax profile m¯ in every coordinate
(i.e. a1i 6= m¯i for all i), a2 is set to equal m¯ and all remaining actions are ordered arbitrarily;
(ii) p1 ≥ 2 and p2 ≥ 1; and (iii) pj/∑rl=1 pl is close to the coefficient of u(aj) in the convex
combination yielding u, for all j = 1, . . . , r.
The above equilibrium path is then implemented by the following strategy profile. It
first begins at any date t < p1 by playing the equilibrium action a1 if no deviation from
a1 has occurred. It continues with playing the equilibrium path after any history of length
greater or equal to p1 if the M -tail of the history either contains p1 consecutive occurrences
of a1 followed by the subsequent actions of the equilibrium path (if any) or, for some t < p1,
consists ofM−t consecutive occurrences of m¯ followed by the first t actions of the equilibrium
12Recall that A = {a1, . . . , ar} and (a; k) denotes the history consisting of the play of action profile a for
k consecutive periods.
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cycle. At any other history, the strategy profile prescribes playing m¯.13’14
In this construction the sequence (a1; p1) at the beginning of the equilibrium cycle is
the required signalling phase described above. It trivially appears infinitely often on the
equilibrium path and it differs from the punishment phase of playing m¯ consecutively.
Furthermore, no single player deviation, either from the equilibrium path or from the
punishment path, can escape the punishment phase. To see this note first that because
a1i 6= m¯i, for all i = 1, 2, no single player can deviate from the mutual minmaxing phase and
induce the signalling phase that is necessary to escape punishment. The same holds also
regarding deviations from histories whose M -tail consists of consists of M − t consecutive
occurrences of m¯ followed by the first t actions of the equilibrium cycle, for some t < p1,
because a player deviating singly from a1 will lead to an action different from both a1 and
m¯. Last, consider any single-player deviation from the equilibrium path. Such a deviation
does not result in a punishment phase only if the M -tail of the history after the deviation
either contains p1 consecutive occurrences of a1 followed by the subsequent actions of the
equilibrium path (if any) or, for some t < p1, consists of M − t consecutive occurrences of
m¯ followed by the first t actions of the equilibrium cycle. The latter cannot happen because
the M -tail does not contain p1 consecutive a1s and hence the deviation could not be from
the equilibrium path. Consider then the former case. In this case such a deviation is feasible
only if the p1-tail is (a1; p1). Since p1 ≥ 2, both the action profile induced by the deviation
and the action profile just before the deviation must be a1. But, on the equilibrium path,
only a1 or m¯ follow a1. Since the deviation induces a1, then it must be that the deviation is
from m¯. But m¯ differs from a1 in every coordinate, which implies that single-player deviation
cannot produce such a history.
In the above construction of the equilibrium cycle, we have assumed that p1 ≥ 2 and
p2 ≥ 1. To illustrate why these conditions cannot be weakened, consider the repeated
13To complete the result, we need to set M to be large enough so that with M memory (i) all individually
rational payoffs can be approximately obtained by average payoff of a finite cycle paths and (ii) to distinguish
between the different paths and phases.
14Note that the above strategy profile is not simple. This is because the punishment path is not unique:
the number of times the mutual minmax action is to be played in response to a deviation depends on the
number of times the mutual minmax appears before the punishment starts.
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Prisoners’ Dilemma described in the introduction. Since, in this example, m¯ = (D,D) and
the profile that differs from m¯ in every component is (C,C), it follows that, if we order the
set of action profiles as above, then a1 = (C,C), a2 = m¯, a3 = (D,C), a4 = (C,D).
To see why p2 ≥ 1, suppose that the equilibrium cycle is such that p1 = 2, p2 = 0,
and p3 ≥ 1. If the M -tail of a history is given by (a1, . . . , aM−2, (C,C), (C,C)) for some
sequence of action profiles a1, . . . , aM−2, then the signalling phase (C,C), (C,C) is observed
and the players should play (D,C). But if player 1 deviates and plays C at this history, the
next period M -tail of the resulting history would be (a2, . . . , aM−1, (C,C), (C,C)). Since the
signaling phase is observed again such deviation does not trigger the punishment path.
To see why we need p1 ≥ 2, suppose that the equilibrium cycle is such that p1 =
p2 = 1 and p3 ≥ 1. Then the strategy recommends (D,C) at any history whose M -tail
equals (a1, . . . , aM−2, (C,C), (D,D)), for some a1, . . . , aM−2. But if player 1 deviates at
this history and plays C instead, the next period M -tail of the resulting history would be
(a2, . . . , aM−2, (C,C), (D,D), (C,C)). Since this history induces the signalling phase (C,C),
such a deviation does not trigger the punishment path.
3.2 Intuition for the n > 2 case
With no bounds on memory and more than two players, to implement u ∈ U the standard FT
calls for the use of a simple strategy consisting of an equilibrium path pi(0) and n punishment
paths pi(1), . . . , pi(n) with the following property. The punishment path pi(i) for player i consists
of playing the minmax profile mi for T periods followed by a path pˆi(i), referred to as the
reward path corresponding to pi(i); thus
pi(i),t =
 mi if t ≤ Tpˆi(i),t−T otherwise.
Therefore, the typical FT construction consists of three sets of sequences of action profiles:
(i) the equilibrium path pi(0), (ii) the minmax phase for each player i consisting of playing
mi a finite number of times T , and (iii) the reward paths pˆi(i) for each i.
As in the above standard construction, the bounded memory strategy profiles we use
to prove our FT is such that the incentives to play the equilibrium and reward paths are
given by the threat of punishments, consisting of a sequence of the deviator’s minmax action
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profile followed by the appropriate reward path. However, to identify each of the sequences
described in (i)-(iii) and the appropriate action profile that has to be played, we add to the
beginning of each of the above sequences a distinct signalling phase. As with the 2-player
case, once players observe one of these signalling phases, they can identify what needs to be
played and therefore can forget all that has happened before.
For example, each signalling phase could consist of a sequence (s; l) where s ∈ A is some
fixed action profile and l is some number that is different for the different signalling phases.
The idea is that when players observe a sequence of the form (s; l) then, by counting the
number of consecutive s’s, which equals l in this sequence, players can identify which path
to play.
The above, however, may not work as the players need to identify when the signalling
phase starts and when it ends. Specifically, if (s; l) is observed then the history is consistent
with any signalling phase (s; l′) for all l′ ≤ l. To overcome this, we modify each signalling
phase (s; l) so that it is preceded and followed by another action, s′ 6= s.
The addition of s′ to the signalling phases is also not enough. First, we need to ensure that
each signalling phase cannot be induced by single player deviations from another signalling
phase. We deal with this problem by choosing s′ to be such that it differs from s in every
coordinate (i.e. si 6= s′i for all i ∈ N). Second, for reasons that will become clear later,
we also need to assume that each signalling phase starts with two s′’s and has at least
two consecutive s’s. Specifically, each signalling phase in our construction is described by
(s′, s′, (s; l), s′) and we set l in each phase as follows: l = i+1 for the minmax path of player
i, l = n+ 2 for the equilibrium path and l = n+ 2 + i for the reward path of player i.
As we discussed before, with δ close to 1, to approximately implement u ∈ U , all that
matters is that on the equilibrium path each action profile is played an appropriate fraction
of times. The same holds for approximately implementing the payoffs corresponding to the
reward paths. It may then seem that the simple strategy profile that we need is as follows:
(i) the equilibrium path pi(0) = (pi(0),1, pi(0),2, . . .) consists of the repetition of the following
type of cycle path (
s′, s′, (s;n+ 2), s′, (a1; p(0),1), . . . , (ar; p(0),r)
)
;
where p(0),j is chosen appropriately so that pi(0) induce approximately u.
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(ii) the reward path pˆi(i) = (pˆi(i),1, pˆi(i),2, . . .), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is the repetition of the cycle
(
s′, s′, (s;n+ i+ 2), s′, (a1; p(i),1), . . . , (ar; p(i),r)
)
;
where p(i),j is chosen appropriately so that pi(i) induce approximately the appropriate reward
payoff.
(iii) the punishment path pi(i), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is given by
pi(i) =
(
s′, s′, (s; i+ 1), s′, (mi;T ), pˆi(i),1, pˆi(i),2, . . .
)
,
where T is chosen appropriately to deter single period deviations.
Unfortunately, the problem is great deal more complicated. An immediate issue is that
we must ensure that the introduction of the signalling phases do not affect the incentives
adversely. On all paths other than one’s own punishment path, we can ensure that the
players play the appropriate continuation path by standard construction that invokes the
punishment for the deviator after any single player deviation from such phases. The same
is however not the case regarding the play of one’s own punishment path.
First, once we introduce a signalling phase at the beginning of each punishment path,
some player may have a profitable deviation in the minmax phase of his own punishment,
if such deviation restarts the punishment path. For example, deviation by i at the begin-
ning of the minmax phase of his own punishment path induces the outcome (s′, s′, (s; i +
1), s′, (mi;T ), pˆi(i),1, pˆi(i),2, . . .), whereas no deviation induces ((mi;T − 1), pˆi(i),1, pˆi(i),2, . . .). If
(s′, s′, (s; i + 1), s′) generates a sufficiently high average payoff, then the deviation will be
profitable. To deal with this problem, we modify the above simple strategy construction
by assuming that deviations by a player from his own minmax action in his punishment
path are ignored and punishment path is not restarted. Such a change in the construction
does not affect the incentives because there are no one-period gains to deviations during the
minmax phase.
Second, some player may profitably deviate in the signalling phase of his own punishment
path if such deviation restarts the signalling phase. For instance, if some player i obtains
a high payoff by deviating from s′ to some action ai, he could perpetually deviate in the
first period of the punishment path and obtain a path consisting in the repetition of (ai, s
′
−i)
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delivering him a higher payoff. Similarly, if some player i obtains a high payoff by deviating
from s by playing some action ai, then he could perpetually deviate in the third period of
the punishment path and obtain a path consisting in the repetition of (s′, s′, (ai, s−i)) which
could yield him a higher payoff.
We deal with this problem by specifying that when there is a deviation by a player
in the signalling phase of his punishment path, the strategy prescribes the continuation of
that particular signalling phase. But this by itself is not enough as we need to ensure that
there is punishment to deter deviations during this phase (if s or s′ were Nash equilibria
of the stage game this would of course be unnecessary). We establish such deterrence by
appropriately increasing the length of the minmax phase of the punishment path for each
such deviation. Specifically, denoting the number of times that player i has deviated during
the signalling phase of his punishment path by θ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , i + 4}, the strategy profile
requires that once the current signalling phase is over, the continuation path consists of
playing ((mi; (θ + 1)T ), pˆi(i),1, pˆi(i),2, . . .). Such construction implies that for every deviation
during the signalling phase the length of the minmax phase increases by T .15
The above modification involving delayed punishments of deviations during the signalling
phases of the punishment paths has two implications that are worth noting. First, each player
i effectively has i + 5 punishment paths indexed by θ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , i + 4}.16 We denote each
of these by pi(i)(θ) = (s′, s′, (s; i + 1), s′, (mi; (θ + 1)T ), pˆi(i),1, pˆi(i),2, . . .) and define the path
pi(i)(θ) without its first t− 1 elements by pi(i)(θ, t).
Second, ignoring one-period deviations by any player i during the signalling phases of
i’s punishment path, as proposed above, means that the minmax phase starts after any
sequences
((a1i , s
′
−i), (a
2
i , s
′
−i), (a
3
i , s−i), . . . , (a
i+3
i , s−i), (a
i+4
i , s
′
−i)), (1)
with ali ∈ Si for all l = 1, . . . , i + 4, has been observed. Therefore, it follows that the signal
15The reason for having θ + 1 instead of just θ is that player i needs to be punished even if he does not
deviate in the signalling phase of his punishment path.
16By the number of punishment paths, we mean the number of distinct paths that a player can induce by
a deviation, excluding the continuation path that occurs when the player does not deviate.
Note also that our construction does not constitute a simple strategy profile because it will have, in
addition to the equilibrium path,
∑n
i=1(i+ 5) punishments paths.
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for the punishment of player i are effectively all sequences satisfying (1) rather than just
(s′, s′, (s; i+ 1), s′). To differentiate between any sequence described (1) from the signalling
phase (s′, s′, (s; i + 1), s′), we shall call the former a generalised signalling phase for player
i’s punishment path.
Given the above, after any history h = (a1, . . . , aτ ), our M period memory strategy
profile f would satisfy the following conditions:
(a) (Equilibrium and reward path histories) Suppose the t-tail of h is (pˆi(i),1, . . . , pˆi(i),t),
for some i = 0, . . . , n and t ≤M , and it includes the signalling phase (s′, s′, (s;n+ i+2), s′)
of pˆi(i), i.e. n+ i+ 5 ≤ t. Then f prescribes players to continue with pˆi(i).
(b) (Punishment path histories) Suppose for some i = 1, . . . , n and t such that i + 4 ≤
t ≤M , the t-tail of h has the following properties:
(i) the first i + 4 elements of the t-tail is a generalised signalling phase of i as described
in (1);
(ii) if t ≤ (θ+1)T + i+4, where θ refers to the number of times that player i has deviated
during the signalling phase (1), the remaining elements of the t-tail are such that the
players other than i minmax i by playing mi−i;
(iii) if t > (θ + 1)T + i + 4, in every period i + 4 < r ≤ (θ + 1)T + i + 4 of the t-tail all
players other than i minmax i by playing mi−i, and the remaining elements of the t-tail
correspond to the first t− ((θ + 1)T + i+ 4) elements of the path pˆi(i).
Then f requires the players to continue with pi(i)(θ, t+ 1).
(c) (Histories involving deviations from (a)–(b)) Suppose case (b) does not apply and,
for some r ∈ {τ −M, . . . , τ}, (a1, . . . , ar−1) satisfies the properties described in either (a)
or (b) above, ar involves a deviation by some player i from f as described in (a) and (b),
and (ar+1, . . . , aτ ) is consistent with a generalised signalling phase for player i’s punishment
path. Then f prescribes pi(i)(θ, τ − r+ 1), where θ refers to the number of times that player
i has deviated during (ar+1, . . . , aτ ).
Conditions (a)–(c) describe the behaviour after histories that have the following feature:
For some t ≤ M , its t-tail contains the entire signalling phase of one of the equilibrium or
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reward path, or an entire generalised signalling phase for a punishment path. In particular,
(a)–(c) specify the appropriate path to be played once these signalling phases are observed
and are followed by a sequence of actions in which there are either no deviations or only
single-player deviations from the path corresponding to the signalling phase.
What if a complete generalised signalling phase does not appear in the M -tail of the
history? The specification of what should be played at such histories cannot be arbitrary as
the equilibrium should be such that it is not in the interest of any player to deviate during a
generalised signalling phase of another player’s punishment path. To deal with this case, we
assume that if a complete generalised signalling phase does not appear in the M -tail of the
history as in (a)–(c) and if, for some t ≤M , the t-tail of the history consists of a single-player
deviation from s or s′ by player i followed by an incomplete generalised signalling phase for
the punishment of player i, then the strategy recommends players to continue with such
signalling phase. For any other history, our construction prescribes playing the equilibrium
path.17 More formally, in addition to (a)–(c) above, we assume that the equilibrium strategies
satisfy the following two conditions at every history h = (a1, . . . , aτ ):
(d) (Histories that involve deviations from incomplete signalling phases) If none of the
conditions (a)–(c) are satisfied and if for some r ∈ {τ −M, . . . , τ}, ar involves a deviation
by some player i from s or s′ and (ar+1, . . . , aτ ) is consistent with a generalised signalling
phase of player i’s punishment path, then f prescribes pi(i)(θ, τ − r + 1), where θ refers to
the number of times that player i has deviated during (ar+1, . . . , aτ ).18
(e) (Other histories) If none of conditions (a)–(d) are satisfied and the last 0 ≤ t < M
periods corresponds to the first t periods of the equilibrium path pi(0), then the strategy
prescribes players to continue with pi(0) (when t = 0 the strategy recommends the first
action on the equilibrium path).19
17The specification of the continuation path here is somewhat arbitrary; all that is needed is that the play
results in any of the equilibrium, reward or punishment paths.
18Unlike in the case of condition (c), there may be several values for r such that condition (d) holds. For
example, if h satisfies none of the conditions (a)–(c) and T 3(h) = ((a1i , s
′
−i), (a
2
i , s
′
−i), (a
3
i , s
′
−i)) for some
i ∈ N and a1i , a2i , a3i 6= s′i, then condition (d) is satisfied with r = τ , r = τ − 1 and r = τ − 2. In our proof,
we take the smallest such r (in the example in this footnote, f prescribes pi(i)(θ, t) with θ = 2 and t = 3).
19Note that at histories described in (e), it is possible that the path resulting from such a history fails
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To ensure that the above behaviour described (a)-(e) can be implemented when M is
finite, however, several issues have to be addressed.
First, we need to set M to be large enough so that it is possible to distinguish between
the different paths and phases. Specifically, let K be such that all individually rational
payoffs can be approximately obtained by average payoff of cycle paths of length K.20 Also,
note that the length of the longest signalling phase in the different punishment paths, the
length of the longest minmax phase and the length of the longest signalling phase of the
reward paths are respectively n + 4, T (n + 5) and 2n + 5. Then, it follows that for the
strategy profile to implement the punishment paths, the memory size has to be at least
(n + 4) + T (n + 5) + (2n + 5) +K. We show in the appendix it suffices to have M greater
than this bound to implement our strategy profile.
Second, even though the signalling phase of the different paths, including the generalised
signalling phases as described by (1), are all different, this does not necessarily imply that,
once they are observed, they can be used to identify the future path of play. For example, if
the signalling phase (s′, s′, (s;n+ i+2), s′) of pˆi(i) appears on pˆi(j) for j 6= i then the strategy
described above may not be well-defined. Furthermore, for these signalling phases to have
the required property that once they are observed all previous history can be ignored, it
should also be the case that they cannot be induced by a single player deviation from some
other path. For example, if for some aj 6= s′j, the sequence (s′, s′, (s;n + i + 2), (aj, s′−j))
appears on the reward path pˆi(j) then there may be an incentive for j to play s′j on the path
pˆi(j) after (s′, s′, (s;n+ i+ 2)), as such a deviation induces the signalling phase of pˆi(i).
The issue here is that we not only need the signalling phases to be distinct from each
other, they also need to be appropriately distinct with respect to the equilibrium and reward
paths, as well as with respect to minmax phases. We deal with these issues as follows.
By the same argument as before, the order by which the sequence of actions {a1, . . . , ar}
to be the equilibrium path. For example, suppose that Tn+i+4(h) = (s′, s′, (s;n + i + 2)) for some i ∈ N
and that h does not satisfy (a)-(d). Then, the strategy recommends the first action on the equilibrium path
s′. The resulting history, denoted by h′, satisfies Tn+i+5(h′) = (s′, s′, (s;n + i + 2), s′), which equals the
signalling phase of player i’s reward path. At this point, player i’s reward path will be played henceforth.
This of course does not generate any problems as the strategy profile still implements a SPE path.
20Notice that K, and hence M , will depend on the degree of approximation.
19
are played on the equilibrium path and on each of the reward paths, as well as the number of
times they are played on the path, do not matter as long as each action profile is played an
appropriate number of times. This freedom to choose the order of the sequence {a1, . . . , ar}
allow us to construct the equilibrium and the reward paths in such a way so that they are
appropriately distinct from the signalling phases.
Specifically we achieve this as follows. The first action profile a1 is set to be equal to s
and is followed by all the action profiles of the form (ai, s−i) for some i ∈ N and ai 6= si.
These are followed by s′, and then by action profiles of the form (ai, s′−i) for some i ∈ N
and ai 6= s′i. The remaining action profiles are ordered arbitrarily.21 With this ordering, on
the equilibrium and reward paths, s′ and action profiles obtained by single player deviations
from s′ are never followed by s or by action profiles consisting of single player deviations
from s, other than in the initial signalling phases. This ordering ensures that (i) for each
i = 0, . . . , n the signalling phase of pˆi(i) appears only once on the cycle path of pˆi(i) and it does
not appear on pˆi(j), for all j 6= i, (ii) the generalised signalling phase for each punishment
path does not appear on pˆi(j), for all j = 0, . . . , n and (iii) no signalling phase can be induced
from single player deviations from pˆi(j), for all j = 0, . . . , n.
There is still the issue of appropriate distinctness of the signalling phases from the minmax
ones. Since the signalling phases consist of two action profiles s and s′ that are distinct in
every component, it follows trivially that the signalling phases, including the generalised ones,
cannot occur when all players are minmaxing a specific player and furthermore the former
sequences cannot be induced by single player deviations from a minmax phase. However,
in our construction we assume that a deviation by any player i from his minmax profile mi
are ignored and the future play is not affected by such a deviation. This means that we
must also ensure that signalling phase, including the generalised ones, cannot be induced by
single player deviations from sequences ((a1i ,m−i), . . . , (a
τ
i ,m−i)) that involve single player
deviations by player i from his own minmax phase. Our requirement that each signalling
phase contains at least two consecutive s’s and two consecutive s′’s at the beginning of these
21For example, when n = 3 and Ai = {α, β} for all i ∈ N , a possible ordering respecting the above
properties would be a1 = s = (α, α, α), a2 = (β, α, α), a3 = (α, β, α), a4 = (α, α, β), a5 = s′ = (β, β, β),
a6 = (α, β, β), a7 = (β, α, β) , a8 = (β, β, α).
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phases deals with this issue.
To see the role of at least two consecutive s’s in the signalling phases, suppose that
instead of assuming that the signalling phases of the punishment path of each i has i + 1
consecutive s’s, we have i consecutive s’s. This means that the signalling phase of player
1’s punishment is such that s appears only once and is given by (s′, s, s′). Consider then
a 3-player game with m3 = (s3, s
′
−3), a history h = ((s
′; 2), (s; 3), s′, s′, s′, (s′1, s−1), s
′) and
M ≥ 10. Since s′ = (s′3, ,m3−3), (s′1, s−1) = (s2,m3−2) and the signalling phase for player i’s
punishment is ((s′; 2), (s; i), s′), it follows that h consists of the signalling phase for player
3’s punishment, followed by (s′3,m
3
−3) being played twice, followed by (s2,m
3
−2) and followed
by s′, the first action of the signalling phase of player 2’s punishment path. Hence, by part
(c) of our construction above, the strategy prescribes continuing with punishing player 2 by
playing
(
(s; 2), s′, (m2;T ), pˆi(2),1, pˆi(2),2, . . .
)
. But T 4(h) = ((s′; 2), (s′1, s−1), s
′) is a generalised
signalling phase of player 1’s punishment. Thus, part (b) of our construction also applies.
Therefore, the strategy also recommends
(
(m1; 2T ), pˆi(1),1, pˆi(1),2, . . .
)
.
The problem here arises because s′ = (s′3,m
3
−3) and (s
′
1, s−1) = (s2,m
3
−2). Hence, single-
player deviations from m3 can induce both s′ and single-player deviations from s, and, as a
result, the continuation strategy after history h is not well-defined.
Having s played i + 1 times in the signalling phase of i’s punishment solves the above
problem as follows. In this case the signalling phase of player 1 is (s′, s′, (s; 2), s′). This means
that if player 1 deviates from s during his signalling phase this is preceded and succeeded
by s and s′ or the reverse. Since it cannot be the case that both s and s′ can be induced by
a player deviating from his own minmax profile, it follows that deviations by player 1 from
his own signalling phase are not consistent with phases involving another player deviating
from his own minmax phase. Hence the problem described above does not arise.
Similarly, to see the role of having two consecutive s′’s at the beginning of the signalling
phases, suppose that instead of assuming that the signalling phases of the punishment path
of each i is (s′, s′, (s; i + 1), s′), we assume that it consists of (s′, (s; i + 1), s′) with only one
s′ at the beginning of these phases. Consider a 3-player game with m1 = (s′1, s−1), a history
h = (s′, (s; 2), s′, (s; 3), (s2, s′−2)) and M ≥ 8. Since s = (s1,m1−1), (s2, s′−2) = (s′3,m1−3) and
the signalling phase for player i’s punishment is (s′, (s; i + 1), s′), it follows that h consists
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of the signalling phase for player 1’s punishment, followed by (s1,m
1
−1) being played three
times, followed by (s′3,m
1
−3). Hence, by part (c) of our construction above, the strategy
prescribes pi(3). But T 5(h) = (s′, (s; 3), (s2, s′−2)) is a generalised signalling phase of player
2’s punishment. Thus, part (b) of our construction also applies. Therefore, the strategy also
recommends
(
(m2; 2T ), pˆi(2),1, pˆi(2),2, . . .
)
.
The problem here arises because s = (s1,m
1
−1) and (s2, s
′
−2) = (s
′
3,m
1
−3). Hence, single-
player deviations from m1 can induce both s and single-player deviations from s′, and, as a
result, the continuation strategy after history h is not well-defined.
Having two s′’s at the beginning of the signalling phases solves this problem as follows.
In this case, the signalling phase of player 2 would be ((s′; 2), (s; 3), s′). But such phase is
consistent with the signalling phase of player 1 followed by 1’s minmax phase only if both s
and s′ could be induced by player 1 deviating from his own minmax profile.22 Since s and s′
are distinct in every component, this is not feasible and, hence, the problem described above
does not arise.
A Proof of the bounded memory Folk Theorem
For all x ∈ Rn, let ||x|| = maxi=1,...,n |xi|. Since U is compact, it suffices to show that for all
ε > 0 and all u ∈ U , there exist M ∈ N and δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ≥ δ∗, there exists a
M -memory SPE f of G∞(δ) with ‖U(f, δ)−u‖ < ε. Furthermore, since U equals the closure
of U0, we only need to show that the above holds for any u ∈ U0. Therefore, in the rest of
this appendix, we show that for all ε > 0 and u ∈ U0, there exist M ∈ N and δ∗ ∈ (0, 1)
such that for all δ ≥ δ∗, there exists a M -memory SPE f of G∞(δ) with ‖U(f, δ)− u‖ < ε.
A.1 2-player case
In this subsection, for convenience, we normalize payoffs so that ui(m¯) = 0 for both i = 1, 2.
Fix any ε > 0 and u ∈ U0. Let 0 < η < mini=1,2(ui − vi), 0 < γ < min{η/3, ε/2} and
ξ > 0 be such that 2ξ < η − 2γ.
22This is because in this case the number of s′’s at the beginning of the signalling phase of player 2 is
different from that at the end of the signalling phase of player 1.
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Order A = {a1, . . . , ar} so that a1i 6= m¯i for all i, and a2 = m¯. Also, for any k ∈ N, let
Uk =
{
w ∈ RN : w =
∑
a∈A
pau(a)
k
for some (pa)a∈A such that
pa ∈ N for all a, p1 ≥ 2, p2 ≥ 1 and
∑
a∈A
pa = k
}
.
Using an analogous argument to Sorin (1992, Proposition 1.3), it follows that Uk converges
to co(u(A)) in the Hausdorff distance. Therefore, there must exist K ∈ N such that
co(u(A)) ⊆ ∪x∈UKBγ(x). (2)
Let p1, . . . , pr be such that pk ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ r , p1 ≥ 2, p2 ≥ 1,
∑r
k=1 pk = K and∥∥∥∥∥
r∑
k=1
pku(a
k)
K
− u
∥∥∥∥∥ < γ. (3)
Note that (2) implies that such a sequence p1, . . . , pr exists. Let u
′ =
∑r
k=1 pku(a
k)/K and
pi consist of repetitions of the cycle ((a1; p1), . . . , (a
r; pr)).
Let T ∈ N and M ∈ N be such that
T > K
(
B
ξ
+ 1
)
and M = 2T +K. (4)
Also, let δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) be such that for all δ ∈ [δ∗, 1)
max
{
δK − δT
1− δK , δ
T 1− δT+1
1− δ , δ
M
}
> T, (5)
sup
(x1,...,xK)∈[−B,B]K
∣∣∣∣∣ 1− δ1− δK
K∑
k=1
δk−1xk − 1
K
K∑
k=1
xk
∣∣∣∣∣ < γ. (6)
Note that such δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) exists because the limit of the left hand side (5) and (6) as δ → 1
are, respectively, T + 1 = max{(T −K)/K, T + 1, 1} and 0.
Fix any δ ≥ δ∗. We will prove that there is a M -memory SPE f with ||U(f, δ)− u|| < ε.
Note that
||V (pi, δ)− u|| ≤ ||V (pi, δ)− u′||+ ||u′ − u|| < 2γ < ε, (7)
where the second inequality follows from (6) and (3) and the third from the assumption that
γ < ε/2. Thus, it suffices to show that there is a M -memory SPE f with pi(f) = pi.
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Before defining the strategy profile f , note the following properties of u′ and V t(pi, δ).
First, for all i = 1, 2,
u′i > ui − γ > vi + η − γ > vi + 2ξ, and (8)
V ti (pi, δ) > u
′
i − γ > ui − 2γ > vi + η − 2γ > vi + 2ξ for all t ∈ N. (9)
(The first inequality in (9) follows from (6), the first in (8) and the second in (9) from (3),
the second in (8) and the third in (9) since η < ui − vi and the last inequality in both (8)
and (9) because 2ξ < η − 2γ).
Second, the following claim must hold.
Claim 1 For all i = 1, 2, t ∈ N and δ ≥ δ∗, V ti (pi, δ) ≥ δTVi(pi, δ).
Proof. Fix any i = 1, 2, t ∈ N and δ ≥ δ∗. Then, V ti (pi) = (1 − δ)
∑K
l=k δ
l−kui(pil) +
δK−k+1Vi(pi) ≥ −B(1− δK−k+1) + δK−k+1Vi(pi) for some 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Hence, since k ≥ 1, it
follows that V ti (pi) ≥ −B(1− δK) + δKVi(pi).
Therefore, it suffices to show that (δK − δT )Vi(pi) ≥ B(1 − δK). This inequality holds
since (9) and (5) imply that (δK − δT )Vi(pi) > (δK − δT )ξ > B(1− δK).
A.1.1 The strategy profile
We define the desired strategy profile f as follows. For any k ∈ N such that 0 ≤ k ≤M , let
Hk1 = {h ∈ H : T k(h) = (pi1, . . . , pik)},
Hk2 = {(pi1, . . . , pik)} if k > 0 and Hk2 = {H0} if k = 0, and
Hk3 = {h ∈ H : TM(h) = ((m¯;M − k), pi1, . . . , pik)}.
We additionally define
Hk =
 Hk1 if k ≥ p1Hk2 ∪Hk3 if k < p1,
HE = ∪Mk=0Hk and HP = H \HE. Then, f is defined by
f(h) =
 pik+1 if h ∈ Hk for some 0 ≤ k ≤M,m¯ otherwise.
Claim 2 The strategy profile f is a well defined M-memory strategy.
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Proof. By the definition of Hki , i = 1, 2, 3, the following must hold: (i) If h ∈ Hk1 ∩ Hk′1
for some k > k′ ≥ p1 then it must be that k = k′ + αK for some α ∈ N, implying that
pik+1 = pik
′+1. (ii) For any k ≥ p1 and k′ < p1, Hk1 ∩Hk′2 = ∅ and Hk1 ∩Hk′3 = ∅ (if the latter
were not to hold we would have pi1 = m¯, a contradiction). (iii) For any k, k′ < p1, k 6= k′,
Hki ∩Hk′j = ∅ for any i, j ∈ {2, 3}. It then follows from (i)–(iii) that f is well-defined.
Finally, note that f is a M -memory strategy because its definition is such that f(h)
depends only on TM(h) for all h ∈ H.
A.1.2 Outcome paths induced by f and by one-shot deviations from f
The next two claims establish the continuation paths f induces after any history.
Claim 3 If h ∈ Hk for some 0 ≤ k ≤M , then pi(f |h) = (pik+1, pik+2, . . .).
Proof. We prove this in several steps.
Step 1: If h ∈ Hk1 and p1 ≤ k ≤ M then h · f(h) ∈ Hk
′+1
1 for some k
′ such that
p1 ≤ k′ ≤M and k = αK+k′ for some α ∈ N. Suppose that p1 ≤ k ≤M and h ∈ Hk1 . Then,
we must have that T k(h) = (pi1, . . . , pik) and f(h) = pik+1. This implies that T k+1(h ·f(h)) =
(pi1, . . . , pik+1). If k < M , the claim of this step holds because (h · pik+1) ∈ Hk+11 and
p1 ≤ k+1 ≤M . If k = M , then sinceM ≥ 2K, we must have TM(h·f(h)) = (pi2, . . . , pik+1) =
(pi2, . . . , piK , pi1, . . . pik−K+1) with k−K +1 = M −K +1 > p1. Hence, the claim of this step
also holds in this case because h · f(h) = h · pik−K+1 ∈ Hk−K+11 and k − (k −K) = K.
Step 2: If h ∈ Hk1 and p1 ≤ k ≤ M then pi(f |h) = (pik+1, pik+2, . . .). This follows by
induction from Step 1 and by noting that pik
′+1 = pik+1 if k = αK + k′ for some α ∈ N.
Step 3: If h ∈ Hk2 ∪Hk3 and 0 ≤ k < p1 then pi(f |h) = (pik+1, pik+2, . . .). If h ∈ Hk2 ∪Hk3
and 0 ≤ k < p1, then by induction, f induces the outcome (pik+1, . . . , pip1) after h. But, since
h · (pik+1, . . . , pip1) ∈ Hp11 , the claim of this step follows from Step 2.
It follows trivially from Claim 3 that pi(f) = (pi1, pi2, . . .). Hence, f implements pi.
Claim 4 If h ∈ HP and k = max{0 ≤ k′ ≤ M : T k′(h) = (m¯; k′)}, then k < M and
pi(f |h) = ((m¯;M − k), pi1, pi2, . . .).
Proof. Fix any h ∈ HP and let k be as defined above.
Step 1: k < M . Otherwise, k = M and TM(h) = (m¯;M) producing a contradiction
because then h ∈ H03 ⊆ H \HP .
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Step 2: If h · (m¯; l − 1) ∈ HP for some l ∈ {1, . . . ,M − k − 1}, then h · (m¯; l) ∈ HP .
Suppose not; then h · (m¯; l − 1) ∈ HP and h · (m¯; l) ∈ Hk′ for some 0 ≤ k′ ≤ M . Since,
a1 6= m¯ and, for any τ ≤ p1, (pi1, . . . , piτ ) = (a1; τ), it follows from h · (m¯; l) ∈ Hk′ that
either h · (m¯; l) ∈ Hk′1 and k′ ≥ p1 or TM(h · (m¯; l)) = (m¯;M). But, the latter is not
possible, because we have by assumption l < M − k (in fact, if TM(h · (m¯; l)) = (m¯;M),
then TM−l(h) = (m¯;M − l) and so k ≥ M − l); therefore, consider the former case. Then,
T k
′−1(h · (m¯; l− 1)) = (pi1, . . . , pik′−1). Since h · (m¯; l− 1) ∈ HP , it must be that k′− 1 < p1.
Hence, k′ = p1, k′ − 1 = p1 − 1 ≥ 1 and m¯ = pik′−1 = a1; but, this is a contradiction.
Step 3: h · (m¯; l) ∈ HP for all l = 0, . . . ,M − k − 1. Since h ∈ HP and f(h′) = m¯ for all
h′ ∈ HP , this step follows by induction from the previous step.
Step 4: pi(f |h) = ((m¯;M − k), pi1, pi2, . . .). By the previous step, f results in (m¯;M − k)
after h. Since TM(h · (m¯;M − k)) = (m¯;M) ∈ H03 , it then follows from Claim 3 that
pi(f |h) = ((m¯;M − k), pi1, pi2, . . .).
The following three claims characterize the consequences of a single deviation by one
player from f .
Claim 5 If h ∈ HE, ai 6= fi(h) and a−i = f−i(h) for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then h · a ∈ HP .
Proof. Suppose not; then h ∈ HE, ai 6= fi(h), a−i = f−i(h) for some i ∈ {1, 2} and
h · a ∈ Hk for some 0 ≤ k ≤M. There are three different cases to consider.
Case 1: h ·a = (pi1, . . . , pik) ∈ Hk2 for some k < p1. Then we must have a = pik, h ∈ Hk−12
and k − 1 < p1. But then f(h) = pik = a; a contradiction.
Case 2: h · a ∈ Hk1 for some k ≥ p1. Then T k(h · a) = (pi1, . . . , pik), a = pik and
T k−1(h) = (pi1, . . . , pik−1). If k > p1, then h ∈ Hk−11 and f(h) = pik = a; a contradiction.
Thus, k = p1, a = pi
k = a1 and T p1−1(h) = (a1; p1 − 1). Also, by construction p1 − 1 ≥ 1.
Therefore, it follows from the construction of pi (a1 is followed by a2 = m¯) and the definition
of f that f(h) = a1 or f(h) = m¯. Thus, either f(h) = a or fj(h) 6= aj for all j = 1, 2. But,
both cases contradict our initial supposition that ai 6= fi(h) and a−i = f−i(h).
Case 3: h · a ∈ H3k for some 0 ≤ k < p1. If k = 0, then TM(h · a) = (m¯;M), a = m¯
and TM(h) = (a′, (m¯;M − 1)) for some a′ ∈ A. But, since h ∈ HE, it must also be that
a′ = m¯. Thus, TM(h) = (m¯;M) and f(h) = a1. But, this is a contradiction, because it
implies that a−i = m¯−i 6= a1−i = f−i(h). Hence, it must be that k > 0. Then, a = a1 and
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TM(h) = (a′, (m¯;M − k), (a1; k − 1)) for some a′ ∈ A. Since k − 1 < p1, h ∈ HE implies
that a′ = m¯, and thus, TM(h) = ((m¯;M − (k − 1)), (a1; k − 1)). But, this is a contradiction
because it implies that f(h) = a1 = a.
Claim 6 If h ∈ HE, ai 6= fi(h) and a−i = f−i(h) for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then
pi(f |h · a) =

((m¯;M), pi1, pi2, . . .) if a 6= m¯,
((m¯;M − 1), pi1, pi2, . . .) if a = m¯ and T 1(h) 6= m¯,
((m¯;M − p2 − 1), pi1, pi2, . . .) if a = T 1(h) = m¯.
(10)
Proof. By Claim 5, h · a ∈ HP . Therefore, it follows from Claim 4 that pi(f |h · a) =
((m¯;M − k), pi1, pi2, . . .), where k = max{0 ≤ k′ ≤ M : T k′(h) = (m¯; k′)}. This means that
pi(f |h · a) = ((m¯;M), pi1, pi2, . . .) if a 6= m¯ and pi(f |h · a) = ((m¯;M − 1), pi1, pi2, . . .) if a = m¯
and T 1(h) 6= m¯. Finally, consider the case a = T 1(h) = m¯. Since f−i(h) = a−i = m¯−i 6= a1−i,
we have f(h) 6= a1. This rules out the possibility that h ∈ Hk′2 ∪ Hk′3 for some k′ < p1.
Therefore, since h ∈ HE, it must be that T k′(h) = (pi1, . . . , pik′) for some k′ ≥ p1. Also,
pik
′
= T 1(h) = m¯ and pik
′+1 = f(h) 6= a = m¯; therefore, we must have k′ = p1+ p2. But, this
implies that k = p2 + 1. Hence, we have pi(f |h · a) = ((m¯;M − p2 − 1), pi1, pi2, . . .).
Claim 7 If h ∈ HP , ai 6= fi(h) and a−i = f−i(h) for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then h · a ∈ HP and
pi(f |h · a) = ((m¯;M), pi1, pi2, . . .).
Proof. It follows from h ∈ HP that f(h) = m¯. Thus, a 6= m¯ and a 6= a1. We will next
prove that h · a ∈ HP by showing that h · a /∈ Hk for any 0 ≤ k ≤ M : First, since pik = a1
for any k < p1, a 6= a1 implies that h · a /∈ Hk2 for any k < p1. Second, h · a /∈ Hk3 for any
0 ≤ k < p1 because otherwise a = m¯ (if k = 0) or a = a1 (if k > 0); a contradiction. And
third, if h · a ∈ Hk1 for some k ≥ p1 then pik = a 6= m¯ and pik = a 6= a1. This implies that
k > p1 + p2. Hence, h ∈ Hk−11 for some k − 1 ≥ p1; but, this contradicts h ∈ HP .
It follows from above that h · a ∈ HP . Since a 6= m¯, it follows from Claim 4 that
pi(f |h · a) = ((m¯;M), pi1, pi2, . . .).
A.1.3 Incentive conditions
Claim 8 The strategy profile f is SPE.
Proof. We demonstrate this result by showing that one-shot deviations are not profitable
at any history.
27
Fix any player i, any h ∈ H and any strategy gi ∈ Fi that only differs from fi at
h; thus gi(h) 6= fi(h) and gi(h′) = fi(h′) for all h′ ∈ H \ {h}. We need to show that
Ui(f |h) ≥ Ui(gi, f−i|h). To show this consider the two possible cases.
Case 1: h ∈ Hk for some 0 ≤ k ≤M . In this case, by Claim 3 and Claim 6 respectively,
pi(f |h) = (pik+1, pik+2, . . .) and pi(gi, f−i|h) = ((ai, pik+1−i ), (m¯; t), pi1, pi2, . . .) for some ai ∈ Ai
and t ≥M − (p2 + 1). Then we have
Ui(f |h)− Ui(gi, f−i|h) = V k+1i (pi)− [(1− δ)ui(ai, pik+1−i ) + δVi((m¯; t) · pi)] ≥
V k+1i (pi)− [(1− δ)B + δ2T+1Vi(pi)] ≥ δT (1− δT )Vi(pi)− (1− δ)B
(11)
where the three inequalities in the above follow, respectively, from ui(ai, pi
k+1
−i ) ≤ B, ui(m¯) =
0, t ≥ M − (p2 + 1) ≥ M −K = 2T and Claim 1. By (9), we have Vi(pi) > vi + ξ ≥ ξ. By
(4) and (5), we have δT (1 − δT )ξ > (1 − δ)Tξ > (1 − δ)B. Therefore, it follows from (11)
that Ui(f |h)− Ui(gi, f−i|h) > 0.
Case 2: h ∈ HP . In this case, by Claim 4 and Claim 7 respectively, pi(f |h) = ((m¯;M −
t), pi1, pi2, . . .) for some 0 ≤ t < M and pi(gi, f−i|h) = ((ai, m¯−i), (m¯;M), pi1, pi2, . . .) for some
ai ∈ Ai. Since ui(m¯) = 0 and ui(ai, m¯−i) ≤ maxa′i∈Ai ui(a′i, m¯−i) = vi, we must then have
Ui(f |h)− Ui(gi, f−i|h) ≥ δM−tVi(pi)− [(1− δ)vi + δM+1Vi(pi)] ≥
δMVi(pi)− [(1− δ)vi + δM+1Vi(pi)] ≥ (1− δ)(δMVi(pi)− vi).
(12)
By (9), we have that Vi(pi) > vi + 2ξ . Also, by (5), we have δ
M > B
B+ξ
≥ vi
vi+ξ
. Therefore,
δMVi(pi)− vi > 0. But then, by (12), we have Ui(f |h)− Ui(gi, f−i|h) > 0.
A.2 More than 2-player case
In this subsection, for convenience, we normalize payoffs so that vi = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Fix any ε > 0 and any u ∈ U0. Then, by Theorem 1 (Step 1) in Abreu, Dutta, and
Smith (1994), for all i ∈ N there exists yi ∈ U0 satisfying the following property: for some
0 < ζ ′ < mini yii, y
i
i + ζ
′ < ui and yii + ζ
′ < yji for all j ∈ N with j 6= i. Define ξ > 0 to be
such that 4ξ < ζ ′ and ζ = ζ ′ − 4ξ.
Fix any s and s′, both in S, such that si 6= s′i for all i ∈ N . For all k ∈ N, let Vk be the
set of u′ ∈ co(u(A)) such that u′ = ∑a∈S pau(a)/k for some {pa}a∈A satisfying pa ∈ N and
pa ≥ 2n+2 for all a ∈ S, ps′ ≥ 3, ps ≥ 4n+4 and
∑
a∈S pa = k. Using an analogous argument
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to Sorin (1992, Proposition 1.3), it follows that Vk converges to co(u(A)). Therefore, there
must exist K ∈ N such that
co(u(A)) ⊆ ∪x∈VKBξ(x). (13)
For all aˆ ∈ A and j ∈ N , letDj(aˆ) = {a ∈ A : a−j = aˆ−j} and D¯j(aˆ) = Dj(aˆ)\{aˆ}. Define
D(aˆ) = ∪j∈NDj(aˆ) and D¯(aˆ) = ∪j∈ND¯j(aˆ). Order all the actions in A = {a1, . . . , ar} as
follows: a1 = s, a2, . . . , a|D¯(s)|+1 are the different elements D¯(s), in any order, a|D¯(s)|+2 = s′,
a|D¯(s)|+3, . . . , a|D¯(s)|+|D¯(s
′)|+2 are the different elements of D¯(s′), in any order, and all the
remaining actions are then ordered arbitrarily.
To simplify notation, we also denote y0 = u. For all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, let xi ∈ VK be such
that ||xi − yi|| < ξ and {pia}a∈S be such that 1K
∑K
a∈S p
i
auj(a) = x
i
j, for all j ∈ N . For all
i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, define pˆi(i) as the repetition of the cycle
(
(s′; 2), (s;n+ i+ 2), s′, (a1; p(i),1), . . . , (ar; p(i),r)
)
,
where p(i),j = piaj − 3 if aj = s′, p(i),j = piaj − (n+ i+ 2) if aj = s and p(i),j = piaj otherwise.
Note that the length of the cycle is K, i.e.,
∑r
j=1 p
(i),j +n+5+ i = K, for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
In the construction below, pˆi(i) will be the equilibrium path when i = 0 (also sometimes
denoted by pi(0)) and the reward path of player i when i > 0.
Let T ∈ N be such that
T > 2max
{
(K + n+ 6)
B
ζ
,K
}
. (14)
Also let pi(i) =
(
(s′; 2), (s; i+ 1), s′, (mi;T ), pˆi(i)
)
and
pi(i)(θ, t) =

(
pi(i),t, . . . , pi(i),i+4, (mi; (θ + 1)T ), pˆi(i)
)
if t ≤ i+ 4 and(
(mi; (θ + 1)T ), pˆi(i)
)
if t = i+ 5,
for any i ∈ N , θ ∈ N0 and t ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5}. Define the size of the memory M ∈ N be such
that M ≥ T (n+5)+ (n+4)+ (2n+5)+K. Also, let δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) be such that δ ≥ δ∗ implies
min
{
δK − δn+6+T
2− δK − δn+6 ,
δn+5+(n+4)T (1− δT )
2(1− δn+5) ,
δ(n+5)(T+1)
2− 2δ(n+5)(T+1) − δn+6(1− δT )
}
>
B
ζ
(15)
sup
x∈[−B,B]K
∣∣∣∣∣ 1− δ1− δK
K∑
k=1
δk−1xk − 1
K
K∑
k=1
xk
∣∣∣∣∣ < ξ. (16)
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Note that such δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) exists because the limit of the left hand side of (15) and (16) as
δ → 1 are, respectively, min{(T +n+6−K)/(K+n+6), T/2(n+5)} and 0, and the former
limit exceeds B/ζ by (14).
Fix any δ ≥ δ∗. We will now demonstrate the result by constructing a M -memory SPE
strategy profile f with ||U(f) − u|| < ε. Before constructing such a profile, note that the
payoffs the different paths pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n) induce satisfy the following.
Claim 9 For all i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and d, d′ ∈ N with d 6= d′:
−B(1− δ(n+5)(T+1)) + δ(n+5)(T+1)Vd(pˆi(d′)) > B(1− δn+6) + δn+6+TVd(pˆi(d)), (17)
−B(1− δK) + δKVd(pˆi(i)) > (1− δn+6)B + δn+6+TVd(pˆi(d)), (18)
−(1− δn+5)B + δn+5+(n+4)TVd(pˆi(d)) > (1− δn+5)B + δ(n+5)(T+1)Vd(pˆi(d)). (19)
Proof. First, by (16) and the definition of {xj}nj=0, {yj}nj=0, {pˆi(j)}nj=0, ξ, ζ and ζ ′, we have
the following two conditions:
Vd(pˆi
(d)) > xdd − ξ > ydd − 2ξ > ζ, (20)
Vd(pˆi
(d′)) > xd
′
d − ξ > yd
′
d − 2ξ > ydd + ζ ′ − 2ξ > Vd(pˆi(d)) + ζ ′ − 4ξ = Vd(pˆi(d)) + ζ.(21)
By (15), we have δ(n+5)(T+1)ζ > B(2 − 2δ(n+5)(T+1) − δn+6(1 − δT )). Then (17) follows
immediately from (21).
Consider inequality (18). Since K < T , (17) implies (18) when d, i ∈ N and d 6= i.
Therefore, to demonstrate (18), it suffices to consider two cases: i = 0 and d = i ∈ N .
By (21) and (15) we have (Vd(pˆi
(0)) − Vd(pˆi(d)))δK > B(2 − δK − δn+6). This, together
with K < T and (20), implies that (18) holds when i = 0.
By (20) and (15), Vd(pˆi
(d))(δK − δn+6+T ) > ζ(δK − δn+6+T ) > B(2 − δK − δn+6). This
implies that (18) holds when d = i ∈ N .
Finally, consider (19). By (20) and (15), Vd(pˆi
(d))δn+5+(n+4)T (1− δT ) > ζδn+5+(n+4)T (1−
δT ) > 2B(1− δn+5). This implies that (19) holds.
A.2.1 The strategy profile
For all τ ∈ N and d ∈ N , define
Σd,τ =
{
h ∈ H : h = (at)τt=1 such that at ∈ Dd(s) if t = 3, . . . , d+ 3
and at ∈ Dd(s′) if t = 1, 2, d+ 4
}
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and Σd,0 = {H0} for all d ∈ N . Also, for all τ ≥ d+ 4 and all h ∈ Σd,τ , let
θ(h) = |{t ∈ {1, 2, d+ 4} : atd 6= s′d}|+ |{t ∈ {3, . . . , d+ 3} : atd 6= sd}|.
For all d ∈ N and τ ∈ N, define
Γd,τ =
{
h ∈ H : h = (at)τt=1 and at ∈ Dd(md) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ τ
}
.
Define for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, d ∈ N and τ, r ∈ N0 the following sets:23
H
(i),k
1,a =
{
h ∈ H : T k(h) = (pˆi(i),1, . . . , pˆi(i),k)} ,
H
(i),k
1,b =
{
h ∈ H : h = (pˆi(i),1, . . . , pˆi(i),k)} ,
H
(i),k
1 = H
(i),k
1,a ∪H(i),k1,b ,
Hk,d,τ2 =
{
h ∈ H : T k(h) = h¯ · a · h˜ such that for some k′ ≤ k and i ∈ {0, . . . , n}
(1) either h¯ ∈ H(i),k′1,a with k′ ≥ n+ i+ 5 or h¯ ∈ H(i),k
′
1,b with `(h) = k,
k′ < n+ 5 and i = 0, (2) a ∈ D¯d(pˆi(i),k′+1), (3) h˜ ∈ Σd,τ and
(4) if T d+3(h¯ · a) = ((s′; 2), (s; d), a) and a ∈ D¯d(s), then `(h˜) = 0
}
,
Hk,d3 =
{
h ∈ H : T k(h) = h¯ · h˜ such that (1) h¯ ∈ Σd,d+4 and
(2) h˜ ∈ Γd,l for some 0 ≤ l < (θ(h¯) + 1)T
}
,
Hk,d,r4 =
{
h ∈ H : T k(h) = h¯ · hˆ · h˜ such that (1) h¯ ∈ Σd,d+4,
(2) hˆ ∈ Γd,l with l = (θ(h¯) + 1)T and (3) h˜ ∈ H(d),r1,b
}
,
Hk,d,τ5 =
{
h ∈ H : T k(h) = h¯ · a · h˜ such that for some k′ ≤ k and i ∈ N
(1) either h¯ ∈ Hk′,i3 , a ∈ D¯d(mi) and d 6= i
or h¯ ∈ Hk′,i,r4 and a ∈ D¯d(pˆi(i),r+1) for some r < n+ i+ 5, (2) h˜ ∈ Σd,τ and
(3) if T d+3(h¯ · a) = ((s′; 2), (s; d), a) and a ∈ D¯d(s), then `(h˜) = 0
}
.
We next define H1,a = ∪ni=0
(
∪Mk=n+i+5H(i),k1,a
)
, H
(0),0
1,b = {H0}, H1,b = ∪n+4k=0H(0),k1,b , H1 =
H1,a ∪H1,b, H2 = ∪Mk=1
(
∪d∈N
(
∪d+3τ=0Hk,d,τ2
))
, H3 = ∪Mk=1
(
∪d∈NHk,d3
)
,
H4 = ∪Mk=1
(
∪d∈N
(
∪n+d+4r=0 Hk,d,r4
))
, and H5 = ∪Mk=1
(
∪d∈N
(
∪d+3τ=0Hk,d,τ5
))
.
23Note that, for some of these parameters, the sets below may be empty in some cases.
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Let Σ˜d,τ = {h ∈ H : T τ+1(h) = a · h˜, h˜ ∈ Σd,τ and a ∈ D¯d(s) ∪ D¯d(s′)} for all d ∈ N and
τ ∈ N0. Define, for all d ∈ N and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 3},
Hd,τ6 =
(
H \ ∪5l=1Hl
) ∩ Σ˜d,τ .
Let H6 = ∪d∈N
(
∪d+3τ=0Hd,τ6
)
. Also, for all t ∈ {0, . . . , n+ 4}, define
H t7 = {h ∈ H \ ∪6l=1Hl : T t(h) ∈ H(0),t1,b }.
The strategy f is now defined as follows: For any h ∈ H,
f(h) =

pˆi(0),k+1 if h ∈ H(0),k1,b for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n+ 4},
pˆi(i),k+1 if h ∈ H(i),k1,a for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and k ∈ {n+ i+ 5, . . . ,M},
s if h ∈
(
∪Mk=1 ∪d∈N ∪d+2τ=2(Hk,d,τ2 ∪Hk,d,τ5 ∪Hd,τ6 )
)
∪ (∪n+3t=2H t7) ,
md if h ∈ ∪Mk=1Hk,d3 for some d ∈ N,
pˆi(d),r+1 if h ∈ ∪Mk=1Hk,d,r4 for some d ∈ N and r ∈ {0, . . . , n+ d+ 4},
s′ otherwise.
A.2.2 Auxiliary results
Claim 10 For all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, the following hold:
1. All actions a 6= s′ are played for t ≥ n+ i+ 2 consecutive periods in pˆi(i).
2. Suppose that, for some t ∈ N, (pˆi(i),t, . . . , pˆi(i),t+l) = (s′, (s; l)) and 0 < l < 2n+3. Then
either pˆi(i),t+l+1 = s or pˆi(i),t+l+1 = s′ and l = n+ i+ 2,
3. Suppose that, for some t ∈ N, (pˆi(i),t, . . . , pˆi(i),t+l+1) = ((s′; 2), (s; l)) and l > 0. Then
either pˆi(i),t+l+2 = s or pˆi(i),t+l+2 = s′ and l = n+ i+ 2, and
4. Suppose that, for some t ∈ N, pˆi(i),t ∈ D(s′) and pˆi(i),t+1 ∈ D(s). Then pˆi(i),t = s′ and
pˆi(i),t+1 = s. Furthermore, either (i) pˆi(i),t−1 = s′ and t = 2 + βK or (ii) pˆi(i),t−1 = s
and t = n+ i+ 5 + βK for some β ∈ N0.
5. Suppose that, for some t ∈ N, pˆi(i),t ∈ D(s) and pˆi(i),t+1 ∈ D(s′). Then pˆi(i),t+1 = s′.
Proof. This follows immediately from the ordering of A and the definition of pˆi(i).
Claim 11 If h ∈ H(i),k1,a for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and k ∈ {n + i + 5, . . . ,M}, then T k′(h) 6∈
Σd,k
′
for all d ∈ N and k′ ∈ N such that d+ 4 ≤ k′ ≤ k.
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Proof. Suppose otherwise; then there exists h ∈ H(i),k1,a such that T k′(h) ∈ Σd,k′ for some
d ∈ N and k′ ∈ N with d + 4 ≤ k′ ≤ k. Let T k(h) = (a1, . . . , ak). Since T k′(h) ∈ Σd,k′ , we
have ak−k
′+2 ∈ D(s′), ak−k′+3 ∈ D(s) and ak−k′+d+4 ∈ D(s′). Therefore, there is an action,
namely ak−k
′+3, which is different from s′ and is played at most d+1 consecutive periods in
T k(h). Since h ∈ H(i),k1,a , this contradicts Claim 10.1.
Next, for all τ ∈ N and i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, define
Λi,τ =
{
h ∈ H : h = (at)τt=1 such that at = pˆi(i),t if t ≤ n+ i+ 5
}
.
Claim 12 If h ∈ H(i),k1,a for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and k ∈ {n+i+5, . . . ,M}, and T k′(h) ∈ Λi′,k′
for some i′ ∈ {0, . . . , n} and n + i′ + 5 ≤ k′ ≤ k, then i = i′ and k = k′ + βK for some
β ∈ N0.
Proof. Since h ∈ H(i),k1,a and T k′(h) ∈ Λi′,k′ , for some t = k+1−k′, (pˆi(i),t, . . . , pˆi(i),t+n+i′+4) =
((s′; 2), (s;n+ i′ + 2), s′). It then follows from Claim 10.3 that n+ i′ + 2 = n+ i+ 2 and so
i = i′. Hence, by Claim 10.4, t+ 1 = 2 + βK for some β ∈ N0 and so k = k′ + βK.
Claim 13 Suppose h ∈ Hk,d3 ∪Hk,d,04 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and d ∈ N . Then T k′(h) 6∈
Λi,k
′ ∪ Σd′,k′ for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, d′ ∈ N and k′ ∈ N such that 3 ≤ k′ < k.
Proof. Suppose otherwise; then T k
′
(h) ∈ Λi,k′ ∪ Σd′,k′ for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, d′ ∈ N and
k′ ∈ N such that 3 ≤ k′ < k. Let T k(h) = (a1, . . . , ak). Since T k′(h) ∈ Λi,k′ ∪ Σd′,k′ and
h ∈ Hk,d3 ∪ Hk,d,04 it follows, respectively, that ak−k′+1, ak−k′+2 ∈ Dd′(s′) and a3, . . . , ad+3 ∈
D(s). Consequently, k − k′ + 1 ≥ d + 4. This means that ak−k′+2−d = ak−k
′+3
−d = m
d
−d.
Also, by appealing again to T k
′
(h) ∈ Λi,k′ ∪ Σd′,k′ , one has ak−k′+3 ∈ Dd′(s). Therefore, by
ak−k
′+2 ∈ Dd′(s′), we have that s−d,d′ = s′−d,d′ ; a contradiction.
Claim 14 If h ∈ Hk,d,r4 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d ∈ N and r ∈ {1, . . . , n + d + 4} and
T k
′
(h) ∈ Λi,k′ for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and 3 ≤ k′ < k, then k′ = r and k′ < n+ i+ 5.
Proof. Let T k(h) = (a1, . . . , ak). By T k
′
(h) ∈ Λi,k′ , ak−k′+1 = ak−k′+2 = s′ and, by
h ∈ Hk,d,r4 , at ∈ D(s) for all t ∈ {3, . . . , d+3}∪{k−r+3, . . . , k}. It then follows that k′ ≥ r
and that k − k′ + 1 ∈ {2, d+ 4, . . . , k − r + 2}.
Note, however, that it cannot be that k−k′+1 = k− r+2; otherwise, ak−r+3 = s′. Also,
k − k′ + 1 = k − r − 1 is not possible because otherwise, by T k′(h) ∈ Λi,k′ , ak−k′+3 = s and,
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by h ∈ Hk,d,r4 , ak−k′+3 = ak−r+1 = s′. Furthermore, k− k′+1 = k− r is not possible because
otherwise, by T k
′
(h) ∈ Λi,k′ , ak−k′+3 = s and, by h ∈ Hk,d,r4 , ak−r+2 = s′.
By Claim 13, it also cannot be that k − k′ + 1 ≤ k − r − 2. The reasoning for this is as
follows. Since h ∈ Hk,d,r4 and T k′(h) ∈ Λi,k′ , it follows, respectively, that Br(h) ∈ Hk−r,d,04
and T k
′−r(Br(h)) ∈ Λi,k′−r. But then by Claim 13 it must be that k′ − r < 3.
Hence, it follows from all the above that k − k′ + 1 = k − r + 1, i.e. k′ = r.
Finally, k′ < n + i + 5 because otherwise, by T k
′
(h) ∈ Λi,k′ , ak−k′+n+i+5 = s′ and, by
h ∈ Hk,d,r4 , ak−r+n+i+5 = s.
Claim 15 If h ∈ Hk,d,r4 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d ∈ N and r ∈ {1, . . . , n + d + 4}, then
T k
′
(h) 6∈ Σd′,k′ for all d′ ∈ N and k′ ∈ N such that d′ + 4 ≤ k′ < k.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Let T k(h) = (a1, . . . , ak). Since h ∈ Hk,d,r4 and T k′(h) ∈ Σd′,k′ , it
follows, respectively, that Br(h) ∈ Hk−r,d,04 and T k′−r(Br(h)) ∈ Σd′,k′−r. But then by Claim
13 it must be that k′−r < 3. Therefore, k−k′+d′+4 > k−r+2. Hence, ak−k′+d′+4 = ak−r+t
for some t > 2. But this is a contradiction since, by T k
′
(h) ∈ Σd′,k′ , ak−k′+d′+4 ∈ D(s′) and,
by h ∈ Hk,d,r4 , ak−r+t = s for all t > 2.
Claim 16 If h ∈ Hk,d,τ5 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d ∈ N and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d + 3}, then
T k
′
(h) 6∈ Σd′,k′ for all d′ ∈ N and k′ ∈ N such that d′ + 4 ≤ k′ < k.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, there exist h = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ Hk,d,τ5 such that T k′(h) ∈ Σd′,k′
for the parameters given in the statement of the claim. We now derive a contradiction by
considering six different possibilities. Before doing so, let h¯ = Bτ+1(h) and note that, by
h ∈ Hk,d,τ5 , T k(h) ∈ Σi,k for some i ∈ N .
Case 1: k′ − (τ + 1) ≥ d′ + 4. Then, T k′−(τ+1)(h¯) ∈ Σd′,k′−(τ+1) and h¯ ∈ Hk−(τ+1),i3 ∪(
∪n+i+4r=0 Hk−(τ+1),i,r4
)
. But this contradicts either Claim 13 or Claim 15.
Case 2: k′ − (τ + 1) < d′ + 1. Then, by T k′(h) ∈ Σd′,k′ , at−k′+d′+4 ∈ D(s′) and, by
h ∈ Hk,d,τ5 and t− k′ + d′ + 4 > t− τ + 2, at−k′+d′+4 ∈ D(s); a contradiction.
Case 3: k′ − (τ + 1) = d′ + 1. Then, by T k′(h) ∈ Σd′,k′ , at−k′+d′+3 ∈ D(s) and, by
h ∈ Hk,d,τ5 and t− k′ + d′ + 3 = t− τ + 1, at−k′+d′+3 ∈ D(s′); a contradiction.
Case 4: k′− (τ +1) equals either d′+2 or d′+3 and h¯ ∈ Hk−(τ+1),i3 ∪Hk−(τ+1),i,04 . Then,
3 ≤ k′ − (τ + 1) < k − (τ + 1) and T k′−(τ+1)(h¯) ∈ Σd′,k′−(τ+1). This contradicts Claim 13.
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Case 5: k′ − (τ + 1) = d′ + 3 and h¯ ∈ Hk−(τ+1),i,r4 with r > 0. By T k′(h) ∈ Σd′,k′ , (i)
at−k
′+2 ∈ D(s′), (ii) at−k′+l ∈ D(s) for all 3 ≤ l ≤ d′ + 3 and (iii) at−k′+d′+4 ∈ D(s′). By
h ∈ Hk,d,τ5 and h¯ ∈ Hk−(τ+1),i,r4 , (iv) at−τ ∈ D¯d(pˆi(i),r+1) and (v) at−τ−r′ = pˆi(i),r−r′+1 for all
1 ≤ r′ ≤ r.
By r > 0 and t−k′+d′+4 = t− τ , (iii) and (iv) imply that either r = 1 or r = n+ i+4.
If r = 1, by (v), at−τ−1 = pˆi(i),1 = s′. This, together with t−τ−1 = t−k′+d′+3, contradicts
(ii). If r = n+ i+ 4, then, by (v) and n+ i− d′ + 3 ≥ 3, at−τ−d′−2 = pˆi(i),n+i−d′+3 = s. This,
together with t− τ − d′ − 2 = t− k′ + 2, contradicts (i).
Case 6: k′ − (τ + 1) = d′ + 2 and h¯ ∈ Hk−(τ+1),i,r4 with r > 0. Then, by (ii) and
t− τ = k − k′ + d′ + 3, at−τ ∈ Dd′(s). Therefore, by (iv), at−τ ∈ D¯d(s) and d = d′.
Next, we show that r = d+2. If r > d+2, then, by (v), at−τ−d−1 = pˆi(i),r−d = s. But this is
a contradiction because t−k′+2 = t−τ−d−1 and, by (i), at−k′+2 ∈ Dd(s′). If r < d+2, then,
by (ii), at−k
′+d−r+4 ∈ D(s). But this is a contradiction because t−τ−r+1 = t−k′+d−r+4
and, by (v), at−τ−r+1 = pˆi(i),2 = s′.
By h¯ ∈ Hk−(τ+1),i,r4 and r = d+2, we have T d+2(h¯) = ((s′; 2), (s; d)). Since at−τ ∈ D¯d(s),
it then follows from the definition ofHk,d,τ5 that τ = 0. But this contradicts k
′−(τ+1) = d′+2
and k′ ≥ d′ + 4.
Claim 17 If T k(h) ∈ Σd,k ∩Σd′,k for some d, d′ ∈ N and k ∈ {min{d, d′}+ 4, . . . ,M}, then
d = d′.
Proof. Suppose not; assume that d > d′. Let T k(h) = (a1, . . . , ak). Since T k(h) ∈ Σd,k,
ad
′+4 ∈ Dd(s) and, since T k(h) ∈ Σd′,k, ad′+4 ∈ Dd′(s′). But this is a contradiction.
Claim 18 Let h ∈ H \ ∪5l=1Hl and a ∈ S. Then, one of the following conditions hold: (a)
h · a 6∈ ∪5l=1Hl, (b) h · a ∈ H(i),n+i+51,a for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and (c) T d+4(h · a) ∈ Σd,d+4 for
some d ∈ N . Furthermore, if a ∈ D(s), then h · a 6∈ ∪5l=1Hl.
Proof. Suppose that h · a does not satisfy (a)–(c). Then there are six cases to consider. (i)
h · a ∈ H(i),k1,a for some i and k > n+ i+ 5: then h ∈ H1,a; a contradiction. (ii) h · a ∈ H1,b:
then h ∈ H1,b; a contradiction. (iii) h · a ∈ H2: then h ∈ H1 ∪ H2; a contradiction. (iv)
h ·a ∈ H3 and T d+4(h ·a) 6∈ Σd,d+4 for all d ∈ N : then h ∈ H3; a contradiction. (v) h ·a ∈ H4:
then h ∈ H3 ∪H4; a contradiction. (vi) h · a ∈ H5: then h ∈ H3 ∪H4 ∪H5; a contradiction.
Furthermore, if a ∈ D(s), by the definition of H(i),n+i+51,a and Σd,d+4, (b) and (c) cannot
hold. Therefore, (a) must hold, i.e. h · a 6∈ ∪5l=1Hl.
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Claim 19 If h ∈ H(i),M1,a for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, then h ∈ H(i),k1,a for some k < M .
Proof. Since h ∈ H(i),M1,a , TM(h) = (pˆi(i),1, . . . , pˆi(i),M). Also, by assumption, M > K + n +
i+ 5. Therefore, h ∈ H(i),M−K1,a .
Claim 20 If h ∈ HM,d,τ2 for some d ∈ N and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d + 3}, then h ∈ Hk,d,τ2 for some
k < M .
Proof. Since h ∈ HM,d,τ2 , TM(h) = h¯ · a · h˜, where h¯, a, and h˜ are as in the definition of
HM,d,τ2 . In particular, h¯ ∈ H(i),k
′
1,a ∪ H(0),k
′
1,b for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and k′ ≤ M − (τ + 1).
Therefore, h ∈ Hk′+τ+1,d,τ2 .
If k′+τ+1 < M , the claim trivially follows. If k′+τ+1 = M , then h¯ = (pˆi(i),1, . . . , pˆi(i),M−(τ+1))
for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Also, by assumption, M ≥ (n + 4) + (2n + 5) + K. Therefore,
h¯ ∈ H(i),M−(τ+1)−K1,a and hence h ∈ HM−K,d,τ2 .
Claim 21 If h ∈ Hk,d3 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and d ∈ N , then k < M .
Proof. Let h¯ and h˜ be such that T k(h) = h¯ · h˜ and satisfy the conditions in the definition
of Hk,d3 . Then k = `(h¯) + `(h˜) < d+ 4 + (θ(h¯) + 1)T ≤ n+ 4 + (n+ 5)T < M .
Claim 22 If h ∈ Hk,d,r4 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d ∈ N and r ∈ {0, . . . , n + d + 4}, then
k < M .
Proof. Let h¯, hˆ and h˜ be such that T k(h) = h¯ · hˆ · h˜ and satisfy the conditions in the
definition of Hk,d,r4 . Then k ≤ `(h¯) + `(hˆ) + `(h˜) = d + 4 + (θ(h¯) + 1)T + n + d + 4 ≤
n+ 4 + (n+ 5)T + 2n+ 4 < M .
Claim 23 If h ∈ Hk,d,τ5 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d ∈ N and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d + 3}, then
k < M .
Proof. Let h¯, a and h˜ be such that T k(h) = h¯ · a · h˜ and satisfy the conditions in the
definition of Hk,d,τ5 . By the proof of Claims 21 and 22, `(h¯) ≤ n + 4 + (n + 5)T + 2n + 4.
Therefore, k = `(h¯) + `(a · h˜) ≤ [n+ 4 + (n+ 5)T + 2n+ 4] + 1 +K < M .
A.2.3 Well-definedness of the strategy profile
In this subsection we show that f is well defined.
Claim 24 If h ∈ H(i),k1,a ∩ H(i
′),k′
1,a for some i, i
′ ∈ {0, . . . , n}, k ∈ {n + i + 5, . . . ,M} and
k′ ∈ {n+ i′ + 5, . . . ,M}, then i = i′ and k = k′ + βK for some β ∈ Z.
Proof. It follows immediately by Claim 12.
36
Claim 25 For all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, k ∈ {n + i + 5, . . . ,M} and k′ ∈ {0, . . . , n + 4}, H(i),k1,a ∩
H
(0),k′
1,b = ∅.
Proof. If h ∈ H(0),k′1,b , then `(h) < n + 5, whereas if h ∈ H(i),k1,a , then `(h) ≥ n + i + 5 for
some i ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Hence, H(i),k1,a ∩H(0),k
′
1,b = ∅.
Claim 26 For all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, k ∈ {n + i + 5, . . . ,M}, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d ∈ N and
τ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 3}, H(i),k1,a ∩Hk
′,d,τ
2 = ∅.
Proof. Suppose not; then there exist h = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ h ∈ H(i),k1,a ∩Hk
′,d,τ
2 for some i, k, k
′,
d and τ as described in the claim. Since h ∈ H(i),k1,a , then pˆi(i),r = at−k+r for all 1 ≤ r ≤ k.
Also since h ∈ Hk′,d,τ2 , then T k′(h) = h¯ · at−τ · h˜, where h˜ ∈ Σd,τ , at−τ ∈ D¯d(pˆi(i′),k′−τ ) and
h¯ ∈ H(i′),k′−(τ+1)1 for some i′ ∈ {0, . . . , n} satisfying either k′ − (τ + 1) ≥ n+ i′ + 5 or i′ = 0,
k′ = t and k′ − (τ + 1) < n+ 5. Next, consider each of these possibilities separately.
Case 1: h¯ ∈ H(0),k′−(τ+1)1,b , k′ = t and k′−(τ+1) < n+5. In this case ak
′−k+1 = ak
′−k+2 =
s′, h¯ = ((s′; 2), s, . . . , s) and `(h¯) = k′ − (τ + 1). Thus, since τ ≤ d + 3 and k ≥ n + i + 5,
it must be that k′ − k + 1 < k′ − τ and so k′ = k. But then at−τ ∈ D¯d(s) ∪ D¯d(s′) and
at−τ = pˆi(i),t−τ ∈ {s, s′}, a contradiction.
Case 2: h¯ ∈ H(i′),k′−(τ+1)1,a and k′ − (τ + 1) ≥ n+ i′ + 5. We consider two subcases.
Subcase 1: k ≥ n+ i+5+τ +1. Let hˆ = Bτ+1(h). Since k− (τ +1) ≥ n+ i+5, it follows
that hˆ ∈ H(i),k−(τ+1)1,a . Also, since T k′−(τ+1)(hˆ) = h¯, hˆ ∈ H(i
′),k′−(τ+1)
1,a . Then, by Claim 24,
i = i′ and k − (τ + 1) = k′ − (τ + 1) + βK for some β ∈ Z. This, together with a = pˆi(i),k−τ
and a ∈ D¯d(pˆi(i′),k′−τ ), imply that pˆi(i),k′−τ = pˆi(i),k−τ ∈ D¯d(pˆi(i),k′−τ ), a contradiction.
Subcase 2: k = n + i + 5 + τ . By h ∈ H(i),k1,a , at−τ−1 = s and at−τ = s′. Also, by
h ∈ Hk′,d,τ2 , at−τ−1 = pˆi(i′),k′−τ−1 and at−τ ∈ D¯d(pˆi(i′),k′−τ ). Hence, it follows from at−τ−1 = s
and at−τ = s′, respectively, that pˆi(i
′),k′−τ−1 = s and pˆi(i
′),k′−τ ∈ D¯d(s′). But this contradicts
Claim 10.5.
Subcase 3: k = n + i + 4 + τ . First, we show that k′ ≥ k. Suppose otherwise. Since
h¯ ∈ H(i′),k′1,a then T k′(h) ∈ Λi′,k′ . By Claim 12, this together with h ∈ H(i),k1,a imply that
k = k′ + βK for some β ∈ N. Also, by the supposition that k < n + i + 5 + τ + 1 and
k′ − (τ + 1) ≥ n+ i′ + 5, we have k − k′ ≤ n. Since n < K, we have a contradiction.
By h ∈ H(i),k1,a , (at−τ−(n+i+3), . . . , at−τ ) = ((s′; 2), (s;n + i + 2)). Also, by h ∈ Hk
′,d,τ
2 ,
(at−τ−(n+i+3), . . . , at−τ ) = (pˆi(i
′),k′−τ−(n+i+3), . . . , pˆi(i
′),k′−τ−1, at−τ ). Hence, it follows from
at−τ = s that pˆi(i
′),k′−τ ∈ D¯d(s). But this contradicts Claim 10.3.
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Subcase 4: k < n+ i+ 4 + τ . By k ≥ n+ i+ 5 and τ ≤ d+ 3, it follows that τ > 0 and
k − τ ≥ 2. Hence, by h ∈ Hk′,d,τ2 , at−τ+1 ∈ D(s′) and, by h ∈ H(i),k1,a and k − τ < n + i + 4,
at−τ+1 = s; but this is a contradiction.
Claim 27 For all k ∈ {0, . . . , n + 4}, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d ∈ N and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d + 3},
H
(0),k
1,b ∩Hk
′,d,τ
2 = ∅.
Proof. Suppose otherwise; then there exists h ∈ H(0),k1,b ∩ Hk
′,τ,d
2 . This means that h =
(pi(0),1, . . . , pi(0),k) and T k
′
(h) = h¯ · a · h˜ satisfying the remaining conditions in the definition
of Hk
′,d,τ
2 . Therefore, for some kˆ < n+ 5, h¯ · a ∈ H(0),kˆ+11,b . But this is a contradiction as, by
h ∈ Hk′,d,τ2 , a ∈ D¯(pˆi(0),kˆ+1).
Claim 28 If h ∈ Hk,d,τ2 ∩Hk
′,d′,τ ′
2 for some k, k
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d, d′ ∈ N , τ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 3}
and τ ′ ∈ {0, . . . , d′ + 3}, then τ = τ ′, d = d′ and k = k′ + βK for some β ∈ Z.
Proof. Let h = (a1, . . . , at). First, we establish that τ = τ ′. Suppose, without loss
of generality, that τ < τ ′. Define hˆ = Bτ+1(h) = (a1, . . . , at−(τ+1)) and note that hˆ ∈(
∪ni=0H(i),k−(τ+1)1
)
∩Hk′−(τ+1),d′,τ ′−(τ+1)2 . But this contradicts Claims 26 or 27.
By τ = τ ′ and the definition of Hk,d,τ2 and H
k′,d′,τ ′
2 , we have that hˆ ∈ H(i),k−(τ+1)1 and
hˆ ∈ H(i′),k′−(τ ′+1)1 for some i, i′ ∈ {0, . . . , n}. It then follows from Claims 24 and 25 that
k = k′ + βK for some β ∈ Z and i = i′. Also, by h ∈ Hk,d,τ2 , at−τ = (ad, pˆi(i),k−τ−d ) and,
by h ∈ Hk′,d′,τ ′2 , at−τ ′ = (ad′ , pˆi(i
′),k′−τ ′
−d′ ). Since i = i
′, k = k′ + βK and τ = τ ′, then
(ad, pˆi
(i),k−τ
−d ) = (ad′ , pˆi
(i),k−τ
−d′ ) and so d = d
′.
Claim 29 For all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, k ∈ {n + i + 5, . . . ,M}, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and d ∈ N ,
H
(i),k
1,a ∩Hk
′,d
3 = ∅.
Proof. Suppose that h ∈ H(i),k1,a ∩Hk
′,d
3 . Since H
k′,d
3 ⊆ Σd,k′ and, by h ∈ Hk
′,d
3 , k
′ ≥ d+4, we
have a contradiction to Claim 11 when k ≥ k′. Also, since H(i),k1,a ⊆ Λi,k and k ≥ n + i + 5,
we have a contradiction to Claim 13 when k < k′.
Claim 30 For all k ∈ {0, . . . , n+ 4}, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and d ∈ N , H(0),k1,b ∩Hk
′,d
3 = ∅.
Proof. Suppose there exists h = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ H(0),k1,b ∩ Hk
′,d
3 . By h ∈ Hk
′,d
3 , a
t−k′+d+4 ∈
D(s′) and, by h ∈ H(0),k1,b , ar = s for all r > 2. But this is a contradiction as it implies
d+ 4 ≤ t− k′ + d+ 4 ≤ 2.
Claim 31 For all k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d, d′ ∈ N and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 3}, Hk,τ,d2 ∩Hk
′,d′
3 = ∅.
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Proof. Suppose that h = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ Hk,d,τ2 ∩Hk
′,d′
3 . There are two possibilities.
Case 1: k′ > k. First, note that, for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, Bτ+1(h) ∈ H(i),k−(τ+1)1,a with
k− (τ +1) ≥ n+ i+5; otherwise, Bτ+1(h) ∈ H(0),k−(τ+1)1,b and `(h) = k < k′; a contradiction.
It follows from Bτ+1(h) ∈ H(i),k−(τ+1)1,a , for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, and k ≥ n + i + 5, that
T k(h) ∈ Λi,k. But this contradicts Claim 13 because h ∈ Hk′,d′3 and k′ > k ≥ n+ i+ 5.
Case 2: k ≥ k′. There are two possibilities.
Subcase 1: k′ − τ > d′ + 4. In this case, Bτ+1(h) belongs to H(i),k−(τ+1)1 , for some
i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, and to Hk′−(τ+1),d′3 . But this contradicts Claim 29 or 30.
Subcase 2: k′− τ ≤ d′+4. Since h ∈ Hk′,d′3 , we have (i) at−k′+r ∈ Dd′(s′) for r = 1, 2, (ii)
at−k
′+r ∈ Dd′(s) for r = 3, . . . , d′ + 3 and (iii) at−k′+d′+4 ∈ Dd′(s′). When k′ − τ = d′ + 4,
by (i), (ii) and Bτ+1(h) ∈ H(i),k−(τ+1)1 for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, Claim 10.4 implies that
(at−τ−d
′−3, . . . , at−τ−1) = ((s′; 2), (s; d′ + 1)) and at−τ ∈ D¯d(s). But the latter contradicts
(iii). Therefore, it must be that k′ − τ < d′ + 4.
By h ∈ Hk,d,τ2 , it must be that (iv) at−τ+r ∈ Dd(s′) for all r = 1, 2 and (v) at−τ+r ∈ Dd(s)
for all r ≥ 3. But then by t − k′ + d′ + 4 > t − τ , (iii) and (v), it must be that either
t − k′ + d′ + 4 = t − τ + 1 or t − k′ + d′ + 4 = t − τ + 2. The latter, however, cannot
hold because, by (ii), at−k
′+d′+3 ∈ D(s) and, by (iv), at−τ+1 ∈ D(s′). Therefore, assume
the former. This, together with (i), (ii), Bτ+1(h) ∈ H(i),k−(τ+1)1 for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and
Claim 10.4 imply that (at−k
′+1, . . . , at−k
′+d′+2) = ((s′; 2), (s; d′)) and at−k
′+d′+3 ∈ D¯d(s). But
the latter, together with (ii), implies d = d′. Hence, by part (4) of the definition of Hk,d,τ2 ,
τ = 0. Thus, k′ < d′ + 4; but this contradicts h ∈ Hk′,d′3 .
Claim 32 If h ∈ Hk,d3 ∩Hk
′,d′
3 for some k, k
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and d, d′ ∈ N , then k = k′ and
d = d′.
Proof. First we show that k = k′. Suppose otherwise and assume, without loss of generality,
that k > k′. By h ∈ Hk′,d′3 , we have T k′(h) ∈ Σd′,k′ and k > k′ ≥ d′ +4. But this contradicts
Claim 13 because h ∈ Hk,d3 .
To show that d = d′, by h ∈ Hk,d3 ∩ Hk,d
′
3 , we have T
k(h) ∈ Σd,k ∩ Σd′,k, k ≥ d + 4 and
k ≥ d′ + 4. Hence, by Claim 17, d = d′.
Claim 33 For all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, k ∈ {n + i + 5, . . . ,M}, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d ∈ N and
r ∈ {0, . . . , n+ d+ 4}, H(i),k1,a ∩Hk
′,d,r
4 = ∅.
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Proof. Suppose that h ∈ H(i),k1,a ∩Hk
′,d,r
4 . Then, T
k(h) ∈ Λi,k, k ≥ n + i + 5, T k′(h) ∈ Σd,k′
and k′ ≥ d+ 4. But these contradict Claim 11 if k ≥ k′ and Claim 14 if k < k′.
Claim 34 For all k ∈ {0, . . . , n + 4}, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d ∈ N and r ∈ {0, . . . , n + d + 4},
H
(0),k
1,b ∩Hk
′,d,r
4 = ∅.
Proof. If h ∈ Hk′,d,r4 then `(h) > T . If h ∈ H(0),k1,b then `(h) < n+ 5 < T by (14).
Claim 35 For all k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d, d′ ∈ N , r ∈ {0, . . . , n+d′+4} and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d+3},
Hk,d,τ2 ∩Hk
′,d′,r
4 = ∅.
Proof. Suppose that h ∈ Hk,d,τ2 ∩Hk
′,d′,r
4 . By h ∈ Hk,d,τ2 , Bτ+1(h) ∈ H(i),k−(τ+1)1 . Also, since
h ∈ Hk′,d′,r′4 and T > τ + 1, then Bτ+1(h) belongs to Hk
′−(τ+1),d′,r−(τ+1)
4 if r − (τ + 1) ≥ 0 or
to H
k′−(τ+1),d′
3 otherwise. But, by Claims 29, 30, 33 or 34, this is a contradiction.
Claim 36 For all k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d, d′ ∈ N and r ∈ {0, . . . , n+d′+4}, Hk,d3 ∩Hk
′,d′,r
4 = ∅.
Proof. Suppose that h ∈ Hk,d3 ∩Hk
′,d′,r
4 . Assume first that k = k
′. By Claim 17, this implies
d = d′. Since h ∈ Hk,d3 , it follows that k < (θ(T k(h)) + 1)T + d + 4 and, since h ∈ Hk
′,d′,r
4 ,
k = k′ and d = d′, it follows that k ≥ (θ(T k(h)) + 1)T + d+ 4. But this is a contradiction.
Suppose next that k > k′. Then, by h ∈ Hk′,d′,r4 , T k′(h) ∈ Σd′,k′ with d′ + 4 ≤ k′ < k.
But this together with h ∈ Hk,d3 , contradicts Claim 13.
Finally, suppose that k′ > k. Then, by h ∈ Hk,d3 , T k(h) ∈ Σd,k with d+ 4 ≤ k < k′. But
this together with h ∈ Hk′,d′,r4 contradicts Claim 15.
Claim 37 If h ∈ Hk,d,r4 ∩Hk
′,d′,r′
4 for some k, k
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d, d′ ∈ N and r, r′ ∈ N0, then
k = k′, d = d′ and r = r′.
Proof. To show that k = k′, suppose, without loss of generality, that k > k′. Then, by
h ∈ Hk′,d′,r′4 , T k′(h) ∈ Σd′,k′ with d′+4 ≤ k′ < k. But this together with h ∈ Hk,d,r4 contradicts
Claim 15. Hence, k = k′ and, by Claim 17, d = d′. Thus, r = k− (d+4+(θ(T k(h))+1)T ) =
k′ − (d′ + 4 + (θ(T k(h)) + 1)T ) = r′.
Claim 38 For all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, k ∈ {n + i + 5, . . . ,M}, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d ∈ N and
τ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 3}, H(i),k1,a ∩Hk
′,d,τ
5 = ∅.
Proof. Suppose that h = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ H(i),k1,a ∩Hk
′,d,τ
5 . Then h ∈ H(i),k1,a , T k′(h) ∈ Σd,k′ and
k′ ≥ d+ 4. Therefore, k′ > k; otherwise we would contradict Claim 11.
Consider next the case k < k′ and let hˆ = Bτ+1(h). Then, hˆ ∈ Hk′−(τ+1),d′3 ∪Hk
′−(τ+1),d′,r
4
for some d′ ∈ N and 0 ≤ r ≤ n + d′ + 4. Also, by h ∈ H(i),k1,a , T k−(τ+1)(hˆ) ∈ Λi,k−(τ+1).
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Furthermore, since 0 ≤ τ ≤ d + 3 ≤ n + 3, we have that k − (τ + 1) ≥ 1. Therefore, by
Claims 13 and 14, one of the following must hold: (1) k − (τ + 1) = 1, (2) k − (τ + 1) = 2
and (3) Bτ+1(h) ∈ Hk′−(τ+1),d′,r4 , r > 0, k − (τ + 1) = r and 3 ≤ k − (τ + 1) < n+ i+ 5.
Case (1) implies that t− τ +1 = t− k+3 and case (2) implies that t− τ +1 = t− k+4.
Since T k(h) ∈ H(i),k1,a , we have at−k+3 = at−k+4 = s, and so, at−τ+1 = s in both cases. Since
h ∈ Hk′,d,τ5 , we also have T τ (h) ∈ Σd,τ . But this implies at−τ+1 ∈ Dd(s′); a contradiction.
In case (3), we have that t− τ ≤ t− k + n+ i+ 5. This, together with h ∈ H(i),k1,a , imply
that at−τ ∈ {s, s′}. Since h ∈ Hk′,d,τ5 , Bτ+1(h) ∈ Hk
′−(τ+1),d′,r
4 and pˆi
(d′),r+1 ∈ {s, s′}, it must
be that at−τ ∈ D¯d(s) ∪ D¯d(s′); a contradiction.
Claim 39 For all k ∈ {0, . . . , n + 4}, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d ∈ N and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d + 3},
H
(0),k
1,b ∩Hk
′,d,τ
5 = ∅.
Proof. Suppose h = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ H(0),k1,b ∩Hk
′,d,τ
5 . By h ∈ Hk
′,d,τ
5 , a
t−k′+1, at−k
′+i+4 ∈ D(s′)
for some i ∈ N and, by h ∈ H(0),k1,b , h = ((s′; 2), (s; k − 2)); a contradiction.
Claim 40 For all k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d, d′ ∈ N , τ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 3} and τ ′ ∈ {0, . . . , d′ + 3},
Hk,d,τ2 ∩Hk
′,d′,τ ′
5 = ∅.
Proof. Suppose that h ∈ Hk,d,τ2 ∩Hk
′,d′,τ ′
5 . Assume first that τ ≤ τ ′. Then, Bτ+1(h) ∈ H1
and Bτ+1(h) ∈ H3 ∪H4 ∪H5. But, this contradicts Claims 29, 30, 33, 34, 38 or 39.
Suppose next that τ > τ ′. Then, Bτ
′+1(h) ∈ H2 and Bτ ′+1 ∈ H3 ∪ H4. But, this
contradicts Claim 31 or Claim 35.
Claim 41 For all k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d, d′ ∈ N and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d′ + 3}, Hk,d3 ∩Hk
′,d′,τ
5 = ∅.
Proof. Suppose that h = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ Hk,d3 ∩ Hk
′,d′,τ
5 . By h ∈ Hk,d3 , T k(h) ∈ Σd,k with
k ≥ d+4, and, by h ∈ Hk′,d′,τ5 , T k′(h) ∈ Σi′,k′ with k′ ≥ i′+4 for some i′ ∈ N . By appealing
to Claims 13, 16 and 17, it then follows that k = k′ and d = i′.
By h ∈ Hk′,d′,τ5 and the last two equalities, k − (τ + 1) ≥ d + 4. But then, by h ∈ Hk,d3 ,
we have Bτ+1(h) ∈ Hk−(τ+1),d3 . This, together with h ∈ Hk
′,d′,τ
5 , implies a
t−τ ∈ D¯d′(md) and
d′ 6= d. But, since h ∈ Hk,d3 and k − (τ + 1) ≥ d+ 4, at−τ ∈ Dd(md); a contradiction.
Claim 42 For all k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d, d′ ∈ N , r ∈ {0, . . . , n+d+4} and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d′+3},
Hk,d,r4 ∩Hk
′,d′,τ
5 = ∅.
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Proof. Suppose that h = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ Hk,d,r4 ∩ Hk
′,d′,τ
5 . By h ∈ Hk,d,r4 , T k(h) ∈ Σd,k with
k ≥ d+4, and, by h ∈ Hk′,d′,τ5 , T k′(h) ∈ Σi′,k′ with k′ ≥ i′+4 for some i′ ∈ N . By appealing
to Claims 15 and 16, it then follows that k = k′.
Suppose r ≥ τ +1. By h ∈ Hk,d,r4 , Bτ+1(h) ∈ Hk−(τ+1),d,r−(τ+1)4 . This implies that at−τ =
pˆi(d),r−τ and, by h ∈ Hk′,d′,τ5 and Claims 36 and 37, at−τ ∈ D¯d′(pˆi(d),r−τ ); a contradiction.
Finally, suppose r < τ + 1. By h ∈ Hk,d,r4 , Bτ+1(h) ∈ Hk−(τ+1),d3 . This implies that
at−τ ∈ Dd(md) and, by h ∈ Hk′,d′,τ5 and Claims 32 and 36, at−τ ∈ D¯d′(md) and d′ 6= d; a
contradiction.
Claim 43 If h ∈ Hk,d,τ5 ∩Hk
′,d′,τ ′
5 for some k, k
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d, d′ ∈ N , τ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 3}
and τ ′ ∈ {0, . . . , d′ + 3}, then k = k′, τ = τ ′ and d = d′.
Proof. Suppose h ∈ Hk,d,τ5 ∩Hk
′,d′,τ ′
5 . First, note that τ = τ
′. Otherwise, say τ < τ ′; then,
by h ∈ Hk,d,τ5 , Bτ+1(h) ∈ H5 and, by h ∈ Hk
′,d′,τ ′
5 , B
τ+1(h) ∈ H3 ∪ H4. This contradicts
Claim 41 or Claim 42. Second, note that Bτ+1(h) ∈ ∪i∈N
(
H
k−(τ+1),i
3 ∪
(
∪rHk−(τ+1),i,r4
))
and Bτ
′+1(h) ∈ ∪i∈N
(
H
k′−(τ ′+1),i
3 ∪
(
∪rHk
′−(τ ′+1),i,r
4
))
. Since τ = τ ′, by Claims 32, 36 and
37, k = k′. Finally, it follows immediately from the definitions of Hk,d,τ5 and H
k′,d′,τ ′
5 , k = k
′
and τ = τ ′ that d = d′.
Claim 44 If h ∈ Hd,τ6 ∩Hd
′,τ ′
6 for some d, d
′ ∈ N , τ ∈ {0, . . . , d+3} and τ ′ ∈ {0, . . . , d′+3},
then d = d′.
Proof. Let h = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ Hd,τ6 ∩ Hd
′,τ ′
6 . We may assume, without loss of generality,
that τ ≥ τ ′. Then, by h ∈ Hd′,τ ′6 , at−τ ′ ∈ D¯d′(s) ∪ D¯d′(s′) and, by τ ≥ τ ′ and h ∈ Hd,τ6 ,
at−τ
′ ∈ Dd(s) ∪Dd(s′). Thus, d = d′.
A.2.4 Outcome paths induced by f and by one-shot deviations from f
Claim 45 If h ∈ H(i),k1,a for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and k ∈ {n+ i+ 5, . . . ,M}, then pi(f |h) =
(pˆi(i),k+1, pˆi(i),k+2, . . .).
Proof. By Claim 19, we may assume that k < M . Hence, f(h) = pˆi(i),k+1 and h · f(h) ∈
H
(i),k+1
1,a . Thus, by induction, pi(f |h) = (pˆi(i),k+1, pˆi(i),k+2, . . .).
Claim 46 If h ∈ H(0),k1,b for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n+ 4}, then pi(f |h) = (pi(0),k+1, pi(0),k+2, . . .).
Proof. If k < n + 4, then h · f(h) ∈ H(0),k+11,b . If k = n + 4, then h · f(h) ∈ H(0),n+51,a . Thus,
by Claim 45, pi(f |h) = (pi(0),k+1, pi(0),k+2, . . .).
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Claim 47 If h ∈ Hk,d,r4 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d ∈ N and r ∈ {0, . . . , n + d + 4}, then
pi(f |h) = (pˆi(d),r+1, pˆi(d),r+2, . . .).
Proof. If r = n + d + 4, then h · f(h) ∈ H(d),n+d+51,a , thus, pi(f |h) = (pˆi(d),r+1, pˆi(d),r+2, . . .)
by Claim 45. If r < n + d + 4, then f(h) = pˆi(d),r+1 and therefore h · f(h) ∈ Hk+1,d,r+14 .
Furthermore, by Claim 22, k < M . Hence, by induction, pi(f |h) = (pˆi(d),r+1, pˆi(d),r+2, . . .).
Claim 48 If h ∈ Hk,d3 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and d ∈ N , then pi(f |h) = ((md; (θ+1)T −
k + d+ 4), pˆi(d),1, pˆi(d),2, . . .) where θ = θ(T k(h)).
Proof. Since f(h) = md, we have h · f(h) ∈ Hk+1,d,04 if k − (d + 4) = (θ + 1)T − 1 and
h · f(h) ∈ Hk+1,d3 if k − (d + 4) < (θ + 1)T − 1. Also, by Claim 21, k < M . Therefore, by
Claim 47, the claim follows by induction.
Claim 49 Let h ∈ Hk,d,τ2 ∪Hk,d,τ5 ∪Hd,τ6 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d ∈ N and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d′+
3} and a¯ ∈ Dd(f(h)). Then there exists θ¯(a¯) ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 4} and t(a¯) ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5} such
that pi(f |h · a¯) = pi(d)(θ¯(a¯), t(a¯)) and θ¯(f(h)) < θ¯(a¯) for any a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)).
Proof. We establish this claim by considering the different possible cases.
Case 1: One of the following conditions hold: (a) τ = d + 3, (b) τ = 0, T d+3(h) =
((s′; 2), (s; d), a) and a ∈ D¯d(s), and (c) h ∈ Hd,06 and T d+3(h) ∈ Σd,d+3. In this case, it
follows that f(h) = s′, a¯ ∈ Dd(s′) and h · a¯ ∈ Hd+4,d3 . Thus, by Claim 48, pi(f |h · a¯) =
pi(d)(θ¯(a¯), t(a¯)) where t(a¯) = d+ 5 and θ¯(a¯) = θ(T d+3(h) · a¯). Furthermore, if a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)),
then θ(T d+3(h) · a¯) = θ(T d+3(h) · f(h)) + 1. Hence, θ¯(f(h)) < θ¯(a¯).
Case 2: h ∈ Hk,d,τ2 ∪Hk,d,τ5 and none of the conditions (a)–(c) hold. In this case, f(h) =
pi(d),τ+1 and h · a¯ ∈ Hk+1,d,τ+12 ∪Hk+1,d,τ+15 . Thus, by Claims 20 and 23, f(h · a¯) = pˆi(d),τ+2.
Then, by induction, it follows that f(h·a¯·pˆi(d),τ+2) = pˆi(d),τ+3, . . . , f(h·a¯·pˆi(d),τ+2·· · ··pˆi(d),d+2) =
pˆi(d),d+3. Therefore, by appealing to Case 1, we have pi(f |h · a¯) = pi(d)(θ¯(a¯), t(a¯)) where
t(a¯) = τ + 2 and θ¯(a¯) = θ(T τ (h) · (a¯, pi(d),τ+2, . . . , pi(d),d+4)). It also follows from the latter
that θ¯(a¯) = θ¯(f(h)) + 1 if a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)).
Case 3: h ∈ Hd,τ6 and none of the conditions (a)–(c) hold. For any history h′ ∈ H, define
v(h′) = max{t ∈ {0, . . . , d + 3} : T t(h) ∈ Hd,t6 } and let τ ′ = v(h). Then (i) h ∈ Hd,τ
′
6 , (ii)
T 1(h) ∈ D¯d(s) ∪ D¯d(s′) if τ ′ = 0, (iii) T 1(h) ∈ Dd(s′) if τ ′ = 1 and (iv) f(h) = pi(d),τ ′+1. To
complete the proof in this case, we first establish two subclaims.
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Subclaim 1: h · a¯ ∈ Hd,τ ′+16 . Suppose not. By (iv), h · a¯ ∈ Σ˜d,τ ′+1 and hence h · a¯ ∈ ∪5l=1Hl.
Also, if τ ′ ≥ 2, then a¯ ∈ D(s). Therefore, by Claim 18, τ ′ = 0 or 1 and either h·a¯ ∈ H(i),n+i+51,a
for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} or T dˆ+4(h · a¯) ∈ Σdˆ,dˆ+4 for some dˆ ∈ N .
If h · a¯ ∈ H(i),n+i+51,a , then T 1(h) = s, contradicting (ii) and (iii). If T dˆ+4(h · a¯) ∈ Σdˆ,dˆ+4,
then T 1(h) ∈ Ddˆ(s). Therefore, by (iii), τ ′ = 0. Then, by (ii), it follows that T 1(h) ∈ D¯dˆ(s)
and d = dˆ. This implies that T d+3(h) ∈ Σd,d+3. Thus, by (i) and τ ′ = 0, condition (c) is
satisfied. But this contradicts our supposition.
Subclaim 2: v(h · a¯) = τ ′ + 1. Since h · a¯ ∈ Hd,τ ′+16 , v(h · a¯) ≥ τ ′ + 1 > 0. Therefore,
h ∈ Σ˜d,v(h·a¯)−1. Hence, τ ′ ≥ v(h · a¯)− 1 and thus v(h · a¯) = τ ′ + 1.
It follows from the above two subclaims that f(h · a¯) = pˆi(d),τ ′+2. Then, by induction, it
follows that f(h·a¯·pˆi(d),τ ′+2) = pˆi(d),τ ′+3, . . . , f(h·a¯·pˆi(d),τ ′+2 ·· · ··pˆi(d),d+2) = pˆi(d),d+3. Therefore,
by appealing to Case 1, we have pi(f |h · a¯) = pi(d)(θ¯(a¯), t(a¯)), where t(a¯) = τ ′ + 2 and
θ¯(a¯) = θ(T τ
′
(h) · (a¯, pi(d),τ ′+2, . . . , pi(d),d+4)). Furthermore, from the latter, θ¯(a¯) = θ¯(f(h)) + 1
for all a¯ ∈ D¯d′(f(h)).
Claim 50 Let h ∈ Hk7 for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n+4}. If k 6∈ {2, . . . , n+3} and T d+3(h) ∈ Σd,d+3
for some d ∈ N , then pi(f |h) = (s′, (md; (θ + 1)T ), pˆi(d),1, . . .), where θ = θ(T d+3(h) · s′).
Otherwise, pi(f |h) = (pˆi(i),k′+1, pˆi(i),k′+2, . . .) for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and k′ ∈ {0, . . . , n+i+4}.
Proof. If k 6∈ {2, . . . , n + 3} and T d+3(h) ∈ Σd,d+3 for some d ∈ N , then f(h) = s′ and
T d+4(h · f(h)) ∈ Σd,d+4. Hence, h · f(h) ∈ Hd+4,d3 and the conclusion follows from Claim 48.
If k 6∈ {2, . . . , n+3} and T n+i+4(h) = ((s′; 2), (s;n+ i+2)) for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, then
f(h) = s′ and T n+i+5(h) = ((s′; 2), (s;n + i + 2), s′). Hence, h · f(h) ∈ H(i),n+i+51,a and the
conclusion follows from Claim 45. For the remainder of the proof, therefore assume that the
following holds:
if k 6∈ {2, . . . , n+ 3}, then T n+i+4(h) 6= ((s′; 2), (s;n+ i+ 2)),
for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, and T d+3(h) 6∈ Σd,d+3, for all d ∈ N.
(22)
Next, for any history h′ ∈ H, define v(h′) = max{t ∈ {0, . . . , n + 4} : T t(h′) ∈ H(t),01,b }
and let k′ = v(h). If k′ = n + 4, then f(h) = s′ and h · f(h) ∈ H(0),n+51,a , and the conclusion
follows from Claim 45.
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If k′ ∈ {0, . . . , n+ 3}, then the claim follows by induction if it is the case that h · f(h) ∈
Hk
′+1
7 and v(h · f(h)) = k′ + 1. Next, we show that the latter is indeed the case in several
steps.
Step 1: h · f(h) 6∈ H6. Otherwise, h · f(h) ∈ Hd,τ6 for some d ∈ N and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d+3}.
Then if τ > 0, T τ−1(h) ∈ Σ˜d,τ−1; but this is a contradiction as this implies that h ∈ H6.
If τ = 0, then by the definition of H06 , f(h) = T
1(h · f(h)) ∈ D¯(s) ∪ D¯(s′). But this is a
contradiction because, by h ∈ Hk′7 , f(h) ∈ {s, s′}.
Step 2: h · f(h) 6∈ ∪5l=1Hl. When k′ ≥ 2, then f(h) = s. Therefore, the claim in this step
follows immediately from Claim 18. Next suppose that k′ ∈ {0, 1} and that h·f(h) ∈ ∪5l=1Hl.
Then Claim 18 implies that either h ∈ H(i),n+i+41,a for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} or T d+3(h) ∈ Σd,d+3
for some d ∈ N . But this contradicts our supposition in (22).
Step 3: T k
′+1(h · f(h)) ∈ H(0),k′+11,b and v(h · f(h)) = k′ + 1. By h ∈ Hk
′
7 , f(h) = pi
(0),k′+1
and so T k
′+1(h · f(h)) ∈ H(0),k′+11,b . Hence, v(h · f(h)) ≥ k′ + 1. If it were the case that
v(h · f(h)) > k′ + 1, then T v(h·f(h))−1(h) ∈ H(0),v(h·f(h))−11,b , implying v(h) ≥ v(h · f(h)) − 1.
Since k′ = v(h) and v(h · f(h)) > k′ + 1, this is a contradiction.
Claim 51 Let h ∈ H1 and a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)) for some d ∈ N . Then pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) ·pid(θ, t)
for some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 4} and t ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5}.
Proof. By assumption, h ∈ H(i),k1,a ∪ H(0),l1,b for some i, k and l, and a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)). Thus,
h · a¯ ∈ Hk+1,d,02 . Also, by Claim 49, pi(f |h · a¯ · f(h · a¯)) = pi(d)(θ, t) for some θ and t.
Claim 52 Let h ∈ Hk,d′,τ ′2 ∪ Hk,d
′,τ ′
5 ∪ Hd
′,τ ′
6 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d′ ∈ N and τ ′ ∈
{0, . . . , d′ + 3}. Let d 6= d′ and a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)). Then pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) · pi(d)(θ, t) for some
θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 4} and t ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5}.
Proof. We first argue that it is sufficient to show that either h · a¯ ∈ Hd+4,d3 or h · a¯ 6∈ ∪5l=1Hl.
If the former holds, then the claim follows from Claim 48. If the latter holds, then this
together with f(h) ∈ {s, s′} and a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)) imply that h · a¯ ∈ Hd,06 . Then the claim
follows from Claim 49.
We next establish that either h · a¯ ∈ Hd+4,d3 or h · a¯ 6∈ ∪5l=1Hl. Suppose not; then we
derive a contradiction for the different possible cases as follows.
Case 1: T dˆ+4(h · a¯) ∈ Σdˆ,dˆ+4 for some dˆ ∈ N . Then a¯ ∈ Ddˆ(s′), which together with
a¯ ∈ D¯d(s) ∪ D¯d(s′) implies that dˆ = d. Hence, h · a¯ ∈ Hd+4,d3 ; a contradiction.
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Case 2: h · a¯ ∈ H(i),n+i+51,a for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Then a¯ = s′ and this contradicts
a¯ ∈ D¯d(s) ∪ D¯d(s′).
Case 3: h ∈ Hk,d′,τ2 ∪Hk,d
′,τ
5 and, for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, k′ > n+ i+5, kˆ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
and dˆ ∈ N , h · a¯ ∈ H(i),k′1,a ∪ H1,b ∪ H kˆ,dˆ,02 ∪ H kˆ,dˆ,05 . Then, by the latter, h ∈ H1 ∪ H3 ∪ H4
and, by Claims 26, 27, 31, 35, 38, 39, 41 and 42, this contradicts the supposition that
h ∈ Hk,d′,τ2 ∪Hk,d
′,τ
5 .
Case 4: h ∈ Hk,d′,τ2 ∪Hk,d
′,τ
5 and, for some kˆ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, dˆ ∈ N and τˆ ∈ {1, . . . , dˆ+3},
h · a¯ ∈ H kˆ,dˆ,τˆ2 ∪ H kˆ,dˆ,τˆ5 . By the latter, a¯ ∈ Ddˆ(s) ∪ Ddˆ(s′). Since we also have a¯ ∈ D¯d(s) ∪
D¯d(s
′) it follows that dˆ = d. This, together with h · a¯ ∈ H kˆ,dˆ,τˆ2 ∪ H kˆ,dˆ,τˆ5 , imply that h ∈
H kˆ−1,d,τˆ−12 ∪ H kˆ−1,d,τˆ−15 which, by Claims 28, 40 and 43, contradicts the supposition that
h ∈ Hk,d′,τ2 ∪Hk,d
′,τ
5 .
Case 5: h ∈ Hk,d′,τ2 ∪ Hk,d
′,τ
5 , h · a¯ ∈ H3 and T dˆ+4(h · a¯) 6∈ Σdˆ,dˆ+4 for all dˆ ∈ N . Then
h ∈ H3 and, by Claims 31 and 41, this contradicts the supposition that h ∈ Hk,d′,τ2 ∪Hk,d
′,τ
5 .
Case 6: h ∈ Hk,d′,τ2 ∪Hk,d
′,τ
5 and h · a¯ ∈ H4. Then h ∈ H3 ∪H4 and, by Claims 31, 35,
41 and 42, this contradicts the supposition that h ∈ Hk,d′,τ2 ∪Hk,d
′,τ
5 .
Case 7: h ∈ Hd′,τ6 , h · a¯ 6∈ H(i),n+i+51,a for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and T dˆ+4(h · a¯) 6∈ Σdˆ,dˆ+4 for all
dˆ ∈ N . Then h 6∈ ∪5l=1Hl and, by Claim 18, we have h · a¯ 6∈ ∪5l=1Hl; a contradiction.
Claim 53 Let h ∈ Hk,d′3 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and d′ ∈ N and let a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)) for
some d ∈ N . If d = d′, then pi(f |h · a¯) = ((md; (θ + 1)T − [k + 1− (d+ 4)]), pˆi(d),1, . . .),
where θ = θ(T k(h)). If d 6= d′, then pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) ·pi(d)(θ, t) for some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+4}
and t ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5}.
Proof. If d = d′, then h · a¯ ∈ Hk+1,d,04 if k + 1 − (d + 4) = (θ + 1)T and h · a¯ ∈ Hk+1,d3 ,
otherwise. Thus, in this case, the result follows from Claim 47 and Claim 48, respectively.
If d 6= d′, then h · a¯ ∈ Hk+1,d,05 . Thus, by Claim 49, pi(f |h · a¯ · f(h · a¯)) = pi(d)(θ, t) for
some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 4} and t ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5}.
Claim 54 Let h ∈ Hk,d′,r4 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d′ ∈ N and r ∈ {0, . . . , n + d′ + 4},
and let a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)) for some d ∈ N . Then pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) · pi(d)(θ, t) for some
θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 4} and t ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5}.
Proof. We have that h · a¯ ∈ Hk+1,0,d5 . Thus, by Claim 49, pi(f |h · a¯ · f(h · a¯)) = pi(d)(θ, t) for
some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 4} and t ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5}.
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Claim 55 Let h ∈ Hk7 for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n + 4} and a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)) for some d ∈ N . If
k 6∈ {2, . . . , n+3} and T d+3(h) ∈ Σd,d+3, then pi(f |h · a¯) = ((md; (θ + 1)T ), pˆi(d),1, . . .), where
θ = θ(T d+3(h) · s′)+ 1. Otherwise, pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) ·pi(d)(θ, t) for some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+4}
and t ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5}.
Proof. If k 6∈ {2, . . . , n + 3} and T d+3(h) ∈ Σd,d+3, then f(h) = s′, a¯ ∈ D¯d(s′) and
T d+4(h · a¯) ∈ Σd,d+4. Hence, h · a¯ ∈ Hd+4,d3 and the conclusion follows from Claim 48.
For the remainder of the proof, therefore assume that the following holds:
If k 6∈ {2, . . . , n+ 3}, then T d+3(h) 6∈ Σd,d+3. (23)
Then we will show that h · a¯ ∈ Hd,06 which, by Claim 49, establishes the conclusion of the
claim. We prove the former in two steps.
Step 1: h · a¯ ∈ Σ˜d,0. Since h ∈ Hk7 , f(h) ∈ {s, s′}. Therefore, a¯ ∈ D¯d(s) ∪ D¯d(s′).
Step 2: h · a¯ 6∈ ∪5l=1Hl. Suppose otherwise. Then, by Claim 18, a¯ 6∈ D(s). Hence,
by h ∈ Hk7 , (i) a¯ ∈ D¯d(s′) and (ii) k 6∈ {2, . . . , n + 3}. Furthermore, Claim 18 implies
that either h · a¯ ∈ H(i),n+i+51,a for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} or T d′+4(h · a¯) ∈ Σd′,d′+4 for some
d′ ∈ N . If h · a¯ ∈ H(i),n+i+51,a for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, then a¯ = s′, a contradiction to (i). If
T d
′+4(h · a¯) ∈ Σd′,d′+4 for some d′ ∈ N , then a¯ ∈ Dd′(s′), which, by (i), implies that d = d′.
Thus, T d+3(h) ∈ Σd,d+3. But this, together with (ii), contradict our supposition in (23).
A.2.5 Incentive conditions
To complete the proof of the theorem, we next establish the following for all h ∈ H:
Vd(pi(f |h)) ≥ (1− δ)ud(a¯) + δVd(pi(f |h · a¯)) for all d ∈ N and a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)). (24)
Case 1: h ∈ H1 ∪ H4. In this case, by Claims 45, 46 and 47, pi(f |h) = (pˆi(i),k, . . .) for
some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and k ≤ M . Also, by Claims 51 and 54, pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) · pi(d)(θ, t)
for some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+4} and t ∈ {1, . . . , d+5}. Therefore, the left-hand side of (24) must
be greater or equal to −B(1 − δK−k+1) + δK−k+1Vd(pˆi(i)) ≥ −B(1 − δK) + δKVd(pˆi(i)) and
the right-hand side of (24) is less than or equal to (1 − δd+7−t)B + δd+7−t+(θ+1)TVd(pˆi(d)) ≤
(1− δd+6)B + δd+6+TVd(pˆi(d)). Thus, by (18), (24) must hold.
Case 2: h ∈ Hk,d′3 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and d′ ∈ N . Claim 48 implies that pi(f |h) =
((md
′
; (θ+1)T − [k− (d′+4)], pˆi(d′),1, . . .), where θ = θ(T k(h)). Claim 53 implies that pi(f |h ·
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a¯) =
(
(md; (θ + 1)T − [k + 1− (d+ 4)], pˆi(d),1, . . .) if d = d′ and pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) ·pi(d)(θ, t)
for some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d + 4} and t ∈ {1, . . . , d + 5} if d 6= d′. Clearly, the deviation is not
profitable if d = d′. When d 6= d′, the left-hand side of (24) must be greater or equal to
(1− δ(θ+1)T−k+d′+4)ud(md′)+ δ(θ+1)T−k+d′+4Vd(pˆi(d′)) ≥ −(1− δ(n+5)T )B+ δ(n+5)TVd(pˆi(d′)) and
the right-hand side of (24) is less than or equal to (1 − δd+6)B + δd+6+TVd(pˆi(d)). Thus, by
(17), (24) must hold.
Case 3: h ∈ Hk,d,τ2 ∪Hk,d,τ5 ∪Hd,τ6 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d+3}. Claim
49 implies that pi(f |h) = f(h) ·pi(d)(θ, t) and pi(f |h · a¯) = pi(d)(θ′, t′) for some t, t′ ∈ {1, . . . , d+
5} and θ, θ′ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 4} such that θ < θ′. Therefore, the left-hand side of (24) must be
greater or equal to−(1−δd+6−t)B+δd+6−t+(θ+1)TVd(pˆi(d)) ≥ −(1−δd+5)B+δd+5+(θ+1)TVd(pˆi(d))
and the right-hand side of (24) is less than or equal to (1−δd+6−t′)B+δd+6−t′+(θ′+1)TVd(pˆi(d)) ≤
(1− δd+5)B + δd+5+(θ′+1)TVd(pˆi(d)). Thus, by (19) and θ < θ′, (24) must hold.
Case 4: h ∈ Hk,d′,τ2 ∪Hk,d
′,τ
5 ∪Hd
′,τ
6 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d′ ∈ N and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d′+
3} such that d′ 6= d. Claim 49 implies that pi(f |h) = f(h)·pi(d′)(θ′, t′) for some t′ ∈ {1, . . . , d′+
5} and θ′ ∈ {0, . . . , d′ + 4}. Also, Claim 52 implies that pi(f |h · a¯) = pi(d)(θ, t) for some
t ∈ {1, . . . , d + 5} and θ ∈ {0, . . . , d + 4}. Therefore, the left-hand side of (24) must be
greater or equal to −(1−δd′+6−t′+(θ′+1)T )B+δd′+6−t′+(θ′+1)TVd(pˆi(d′)) ≥ −(1−δ(n+5)(T+1))B+
δ(n+5)(T+1)Vd(pˆi
(d′)) and the right-hand side of (24) is less than or equal to (1 − δd+5)B +
δd+5+(θ+1)TVd(pˆi
(d)) ≤ (1− δn+6)B + δn+6+TVd(pˆi(d)). Thus, by (17), (24) must hold.
Case 5: h ∈ Hk7 for some k 6∈ {2, . . . , n + 3} and T d+3(h) ∈ Σd,d+3. Claims 50 and 55
imply that pi(f |h) = (s′, (md; (θ + 1)T ), pˆi(d),1, . . .) and pi(f |h·a¯) = ((md; (θ + 2)T ), pˆi(d),1, . . .)
for some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d + 3}. Therefore, the left-hand side of (24) must be greater or equal
to −(1 − δ)B + δ(θ+1)TVd(pˆi(d)) and the right-hand side of (24) is less than or equal to
(1− δ)B + δ(θ+2)TVd(pˆi(d)). Thus, by (19), (24) must hold.
Case 6: h ∈ Hk7 for some k 6∈ {2, . . . , n + 3} and T d′+3(h) ∈ Σd′,d′+3 for some d′ 6=
d. Claims 50 and 55 imply that pi(f |h) = (s′, (md′ ; (θ′ + 1)T ), pˆi(d′),1, . . .) for some θ′ ∈
{0, . . . , d′+4} and pi(f |h·a¯) = f(h·a¯)·pi(d)(θ, t) for some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+4} and t ∈ {1, . . . , d+
5}. Therefore, the left-hand side of (24) must be greater or equal to −(1 − δ1+(θ′+1)T )B +
δ1+(θ
′+1)TVd(pˆi
(d′)) ≥ −(1−δ(n+5)(T+1))B+δ(n+5)(T+1)Vd(pˆi(d′)) and the right-hand side of (24)
is less than or equal to (1 − δd+6)B + δd+6+(θ+1)TVd(pˆi(d)) ≤ (1 − δn+6)B + δn+6+TVd(pˆi(d)).
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Thus, by (17), (24) must hold.
Case 7: h ∈ Hk7 and either k ∈ {2, . . . , n+3} or T d′+3(h) 6∈ Σd′,d′+3 for all d′ ∈ N . Claim
50 implies that pi(f |h) = (pˆi(i),k, . . .) for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and k ≤M . Also, by Claim 55,
pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) · pi(d)(θ, t) for some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 4} and t ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5}. Therefore,
by an identical argument as in Case 1, (24) must hold.
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